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NATIONWIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
ALL FEDERAL QUESTION CASES:
A NEW RULE 4
HOWARD M. ERICHSON
INTRODUCTION
Every litigator who remembers first year civil procedure knows that
the personal jurisdiction1 of federal courts is limited by state territorial
boundaries. 2 That limitation, however, may soon disappear in federal
question cases.3 A new rule of civil procedure, currently under consider-
ation by the federal rulemakers,4 would provide for nationwide service of
I Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's power to exercise control over the parties before
it. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979); Delong Equip. Co. v. Washing-
ton Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 857 (1Ilth Cir. 1988). Subject matter jurisdiction, on the
other hand, pertains to a court's power to hear the type of case presented. See Murrell v. Stock
Growers' Natl Bank, 74 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1934).
2 See J. Cound, J. Friedenthal, A. Miller & J. Sexton, Civil Procedure, Cases and Matei-
als 138 (5th ed. 1989); R. Cover, 0. Fiss & J. Resnik, Procedure 1435 (1988); R. Field, B.
Kaplan & K. Clermont, Materials for a Basic Course in Civil Procedure 179-80 (5th ed. 1984).
Three exceptions are the "100-mile bulge" provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f),
the use by federal courts of state long-arm statutes, and the nationwide service of process
provisions appended to some federal statutes. See notes 21-34 and accompanying text infra.
3 Federal question cases are those civil actions brought in federal courts in which subject
matter jurisdiction is premised either on the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982) ("all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties or the United States"),
or on one of the specific federal question jurisdictional grants, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982)
(bankruptcy), 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982) (patents), and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) (civil rights).
Federal subject matter jurisdiction in federal question cases is authorized by U.S. Coast. art.
III, § 2. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 2.3 (1985) [hereinafter
Friedenthal].
4 "Federal rulemakers" refers to the members of the Judicial Conference's Standing Com-
mittee on Rules and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, on whom falls the primary re-
sponsibility for creating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The creation of a federal rule of
civil procedure, in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C § 2072 (1982),
involves a series of steps taken by academics, the Supreme Court, and Congress. Officially, the
rules are prescribed by the Supreme Court. In practice, however, it is the Judicial Conference,
an advisory group comprised of the Chief Justice and various federal judges, that drafts the
rules pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982). The Judicial Conference has a Standing Committee
on Rules, which in turn has an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules that is made up of judges,
law professors, and practicing attorneys.
In general, a rule or amendment is initially drafted by the law professor who is serving as
reporter to the Advisory Committee. It then proceeds through Advisory Committee revision,
Standing Committee review, public consideration of a tentative draft, further revision, and
Supreme Court approval. Before proposed rules become effective, they must be presented to
Congress for review and tacit approval. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) ("Such rules shall not
take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice .... and until the
1117
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process5 in all federal question cases.6
The proposed rule would profoundly affect forum selection in the
federal courts. In practice, the new rule would expand the forum and
expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported."). See generally W. Brown, Fed-
eral Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities 5-34 (Federal Judicial Center 1981); Carrington,
Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067, 2119-24 app. 2
(1989); Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation (Book Review), 87 Yale L.J. 1284, 1284-85 (1978)
(reviewing J. Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures (1977)). For a discussion
of the history of the rulemaking process, see W. Brown, supra, at 1-4.
5 Service of process is the ritual through which a court asserts personal jurisdiction over
a party. See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312 n.61
(D.C. Cir. 1980); R. Casad, Jurisdiction and Forum Selection §§ 4:01, 4:14 (1988); 4 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1063 (1987). Service notifies the defen-
dant of the commencement of an action. While a defendant's amenability to service of process
does not suffice to create personal jurisdiction-the assertion of jurisdiction must also meet the
requirements of due process, see note 25 infra-such amenability is a prerequisite to the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 409
(1987); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1472 (1988). A federal statute or rule that provides for nationwide service of process
entitles a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, subject only to constitutional
limits, in any judicial district of the United States. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text
infra.
6 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(l), at
15-16 (Sept. 1989) (on file at New York University Law Review) [hereinafter Proposed
Amendments].
Although this Note focuses only on the territorial limits issue, the proposed Rule 4
amendments contain a number of other interesting revisions, all designed to facilitate service of
summons. See id. Advisory Committee Notes at 19-20. The amendments strongly encourage
the use of waiver of service by shifting the cost of service to defendants who fail to comply with
a request for waiver without good cause. See id. Rule 4(d), at 5-8. They also reduce the use of
United States marshals. See id. Rule 4(c), at 2-5. Finally, the amendments call attention to
the Hague Convention regarding service abroad and make the use of the Convention
mandatory when available, see id. Rule 4(f)(1), at 9, but provide alternative methods for inter-
national service of summons where internationally agreed-upon means are unavailable, see id.
Rule 4(f)(2), at 9-10.
This Note describes the proposed rule as providing "nationwide" service of process. In
fact, the proposed rule would provide for service of process anywhere in the world. See id.
Rule 4(e)-(f), at 8-10. The proposed rule's significance is due, in large part, to the impact it
would have on foreign defendants. See text accompanying notes 74-77 infra. Because of con-
stitutional limits on personal jurisdiction, however, worldwide service of process pursuant to
the new Rule 4 would not lead to worldwide personal jurisdiction as inexorably as nationwide
service of process pursuant to the new rule would lead to nationwide personal jurisdiction.
This Note therefore refers to "nationwide"-rather than "worldwide"-personal jurisdiction
under the new rule.
The proposal would not extend nationwide service to cases in which subject matter juris-
diction is based on diversity of citizenship. This Note, like the proposal, focuses on federal
question cases. The Note's reasoning, however, could be extended to encompass certain types
of diversity cases as well, particularly those where the federal courts' function is distinctly
federal. See notes 281-89 and accompanying text infra.
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joinder options available to plaintiffs in federal question cases.7 With na-
tionwide service of process, assertions of jurisdiction would be possible in
previously unavailable forums and over previously unavailable parties.
The new rule's impact on federal court practice would flow not only
from the immediate increase in forum and joinder options, but also from
its long-term effect on civil procedure doctrine. The proposed rule forces
a reconsideration of the proper spheres of personal jurisdiction, venue, 8
and forum non conveniens, 9 and in so doing calls into question the
relative weights of the two basic and often conflicting values underlying
personal jurisdiction analysis: sovereignty and convenience.10 Such doc-
trinal purification, beyond satisfying the aesthetic sensibilities of
proceduralists, brings very pragmatic benefits. Efficiency of litigation
and predictability of result, for example, are enhanced by bright-line clar-
ifications of the law.11 If, as this Note argues, the new rule will help
disentangle the hopelessly intertwined notions of personal jurisdiction,
venue, and forum non conveniens,12 then each of those doctrines will be
better able to serve its proper function.
The disentangling of these doctrines is sorely needed. They should
function as a series of filters, each straining out some inappropriate fo-
rum choices. Where the chosen court lacks power over the defendant,
the personal jurisdiction filter should cause any claims against that defen-
dant to be dismissed. If the choice passes through the personal jurisdic-
tion filter but is in a forum legislatively deemed unlikely to be convenient,
then the venue fiter should cause the case to be dismissed or transferred.
If the choice passes through both of these filters, but is nonetheless incon-
venient (based on the case's particular facts), then the suit should be di-
7 See notes 84-90 and accompanying text infra.
8 Venue rules, which are legislatively determined, govern where suit may be brought
within a sovereign entity. See Denver & R.G.W.R.RL v. Brotherhood of RLR Trainmen, 387
U.S. 556, 560 (1967). Venue is "primarily a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses."
Id. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (distinguishing "venue,
which is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum," from "personal jurisdiction,
which goes to the court's power to exercise control over the parties").
9 Forum non conveniens, a discretionary common law doctrine, permits a court to refuse
to exercise its jurisdiction over an action when another forum would be more appropriate. See
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947); Friedenthal, supra note 3, § 2.17. It is
understood here to include the closely related doctrine of venue transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404 (1982). See L Casad, supra note 5, § 1:07; notes 250-55 and accompanying text infra.
Forum non conveniens and venue transfer, as devices for limiting the potential unfairness or
the new Rule 4, are discussed at notes 247-61 and accompanying text infra.
10 See notes 161-67 and accompanying text infra.
11 Cf. Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75, 77 (8th Cir. 1988) (bright-line rule
"enhances predictability of result and promotes judicial economy"); Note, The New Business
Rule and the Denial of Lost Profits, 48 Ohio St. Li. 855, 860, 868 (1987) (goals of "certainty
and judicial economy" served by all bright-line rules).
12 See notes 209-61 and accompanying text infra.
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verted to a more appropriate forum by the filter of forum non conveniens
and venue transfer.
These "court access doctrines" do not function so neatly, however.
They have come to overlap so substantially that they often fail to operate
as independent filters.13 Personal jurisdiction and venue, for instance,
are frequently described as effectuating the same policies. 14 This encour-
ages the collapse of the two filters into one, 15 which decreases the ability
of these doctrines to divert suits from inappropriate forums.' 6 Likewise,
personal jurisdiction doctrine's growing concern with convenience17
makes it somewhat redundant of forum non conveniens, thus promoting
judicial tolerance of each doctrine's vagueness. 8 The proposed rule, by
implicitly asserting that personal jurisdiction is primarily concerned with
power and that convenience must be ensured by other limitations on
court access, promises to assist in separating the filters so that each one
can function more effectively.
If passed, the new rule would represent a dramatic departure from
13 See generally Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doc-
trine, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781, 786-95, 805 (1985) (discussing redundancies in subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens).
14 Id. at 792-93. For examples of this perception of personal jurisdiction and venue, see
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (fairness and convenience to defen-
dant are goals of both personal jurisdiction and venue); Whitten, Separation of Powers Restric-
tions on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 Me. L. Rev. 41, 59 (1988)
("The policy import of venue and personal jurisdiction rules is virtually the same. Both kinds
of rules regulate where an action may be brought."). The current overlap between the two
doctrines is so substantial that some commentators have advocated the use of only one of the
two doctrines to govern the location of federal suits. See, e.g., Barrett, Venue and Service of
Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608, 628-33 (1954)
(venue); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Pt. II, 36 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 268, 300 (1969) (personal jurisdiction). See also Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdic-
tion and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 411, 433-34 (1981) (discuss-
ing Barrett's and Currie's proposals); Whitten, supra, at 59 n.80 (same).
15 See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1968) (interpreting
venue provision to be coincidental with amenability to service of process). Indeed, Congress
has recently acted on this perception by providing that in cases where the defendant is a corpo-
ration, venue will lie wherever personal jurisdiction can be obtained. 134 Cong. Rec. S16,292
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) explicitly linking corporate venue
and personal jurisdiction).
16 Regarding this effect of doctrinal redundancy, one commentator has noted:
[Venue guidelines had little impact on the place of trial beyond that accomplished by
the limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction. This redundancy was exacerbated as
courts reinterpreted statutory venue requirements in the wake of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington to account for expanded conceptions of permissible personal jurisdiction.
The definition of "residence" in the venue statute was interpreted to be consistent with
amenability to process under long-arm statutes, so that venue was rarely an independent
limitation on a plaintiff's choice of forum.
Stein, supra note 13, at 801 (footnotes omitted).
17 See notes 141-46 and accompanying text infra.
18 See Stein, supra note 13, at 805.
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current law. The current Rule 4 generally limits the jurisdictional reach
of a federal district court to a range no greater than that of a court of the
state in which that district court sits; 19 the federal court generally cannot
extend its reach beyond state territorial boundaries unless state law al-
lows it.2o The new Rule 4 would, for purposes of federal court personal
jurisdiction in federal question cases, erase those state boundaries.
This Note argues in favor of the adoption of the new Rule 4's na-
tionwide personal jurisdiction provision. Not only would the new Rule 4
be a legitimate exercise of authority, but it might result ultimately in a
decrease in litigational inconvenience, which would inure to the benefit of
defendants as well as plaintiffs. Finally, using the proposed rule as a
springboard to discuss the confused state of current court access doc-
trine, this Note urges the adoption of more rational and clearly defined
distinctions in civil procedure.
Part I of this Note analyzes the proposed rule's nationwide service
of process provision. After comparing the operation of the current Rule
4 to the proposed Rule 4, it describes the practical benefits the new rule
would bring, particularly judicial economy and more vigorous enforce-
ment of federal law. It then identifies the class of cases the new rule
would affect, concluding that while the new rule would make personal
jurisdiction obtainable in many more forums than before, venue restric-
tions would sharply limit the new rule's practical impact on where suits
could actually be brought. Part II addresses the criticisms to which the
proposed rule seems most vulnerable. The rule might be challenged as a
violation of the due process limitations on personal jurisdiction or as an
endeavor beyond the scope of the rulemakers' authority. Even if it is
constitutional and a valid exercise of authority, the proposal might be
challenged as a bad idea, on the ground that expansions of jurisdictional
reach cause inconvenience and unfairness to defendants. These objec-
tions, Part II argues, prove unpersuasive, though the proposed rule
would engender certain problems of inconvenience and unfairness to de-
fendants. In particular, the new rule might enable plaintiffs to harass
defendants by bringing suit in inconvenient forums.
Part III proposes a response to the new rule's problems. The pro-
posed rule, Part III argues, will help separate the currently overlapping
doctrines of personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens, thus
enabling those doctrines to filter out inappropriate choices of forum more
effectively. Much of the potential unfairness engendered by the new rule
could be prevented by the adoption of restrictive, defendant-oriented
19 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(f).
20 Id. Two exceptions are the "100-mile bulge" and statutory nationwide service provi-
sions. See notes 26-34 and accompanying text infra.
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venue provisions, and by the vigorous use of venue transfer and forum
non conveniens. Finally, Part IV discusses the new rule's broader impli-
cations for the future, concluding that the proposal heralds a step toward
greater rationality in civil procedure doctrine.
I
A NEW RULE 4
A. The Current Rule 4
Under the current Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
federal courts generally mimic state courts for purposes of jurisdictional
reach.2 1 Rule 4(f) provides that "the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held" define the usual scope of effective service
of process.22 Rule 4 thus dictates that a federal court, like the courts of
the state in which it sits, may assert jurisdiction over any in-state defen-
dant. Rule 4(e) allows a federal court to employ the long-arn provi-
sionS23 of the state in which it sits.24 For purposes of asserting
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants as well, then, federal courts be-
have like state courts.25
Two exceptions in which a federal court may reach farther in assert-
ing jurisdiction than may a state court are worth noting. First, Rule 4(f)
provides for a "one hundred mile bulge" 26 in certain cases. In those situ-
ations, the federal court may serve process on a defendant who is out of
state but within one hundred miles of the courthouse. However, the
bulge provision applies only to parties impleaded pursuant to Rule 1427
21 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(f).
22 Id. Rule 4(f).
23 Long-arm statutes, also called specific act statutes, predicate personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant on the defendant's contacts with the forum when those contacts give
rise to the cause of action. Such contacts may include tortious acts, property ownership, or
business transactions. See Friedenthal, supra note 3, § 3.12.
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 411
(1987); Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 847 (11 th Cir.
1988).
25 See DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1983) (construing
Rule 4 to mean that where assertion of jurisdiction depends on state statute, federal court can
reach only those defendants a state court could reach, even in a federal question case).
Personal jurisdiction in the state courts requires not only that the defendant be amenable
to service of process, but also that the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum
state sufficient to meet the requirements of due process. See notes 141-46 and accompanying
text infra. In a case in federal court, if personal jurisdiction is premised through Rule 4(e) on a
state statute, the federal court applies the same minimum contacts analysis that a state court
would apply. See DeMelo, 711 F.2d at 1265-66.
26 See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5, § 1127; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
27 Impleader refers to a claim brought by a defendant against a third party who is or may
be liable to the defendant if the defendant is held liable to the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14;
Tate v. Frey, 735 F.2d 986, 988-89 (6th Cir. 1984).
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or brought in as necessary parties pursuant to Rule 19.28 Moreover, be-
cause the bulge reaches only one hundred miles from the courthouse, its
practical relevance is confined primarily to cases brought in districts
within interstate metropolitan areas such as that surrounding New York
City. The bulge provision is thus limited both in legal scope and in geo-
graphical reach.
Second, Rule 4(f) allows a federal court to serve process on a defen-
dant beyond the state's boundaries "when authorized by a statute of the
United States."' 29 This links Rule 4 to the nationwide service of process
provisions included in a number of federal statutes.30 The Securities Act
of 1933 and the Sherman Act, for example, provide for nationwide ser-
vice of process in certain cases. 31 Such provisions are potentially unlim-
ited in reach; they allow a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a party
28 A necessary party is a party that must be brought in as a defendant in a pending action if
it is feasible to bring in that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19; West Coast Exploration Co. v.
McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 592-93 (D.C Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 989 (1954). The bulge provi-
sion thus does not apply to original defendants; only those brought in later, as third party
defendants or as necessary parties, are subject to that provision.
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840
F.2d 843, 847 (11th Cir. 1988).
30 Congress's power to authorize extraterritorial service of process is well accepted. See
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Toland v. Sprague, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838); Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limita-
tions on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 Viii. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1988). See also Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) (dictum), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 770 (1926).
Nationwide service of process is authorized by the following federal statutory provisions:
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13a-1, 13a-2(4), 18(b) (1982); Arbitration Act award
confirmation, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982); antitrust actions against
corporations, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982); Federal Trade Com-
mission administrative subpoenas, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1982); Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 7 9y (1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1982);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982); Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982); interpleader, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361
(1982); civil action against U.S. officer acting in official capacity, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982);
lien enforcement, 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1982); receiver property actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982);
shareholder actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1982); interstate commerce laws, 28 U.S.C. § 2321
(1982), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1982).
Under many of these statutes, application of nationwide service of process is subject to
restrictions. See note 33 infra. For another listing of statutes authorizing nationwide service
of process, see Berger, Acquiring in Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Proce-
dural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 Utah L Rev. 285, 318-19
n.157.
When federal court personal jurisdiction is premised on a nationwide service of process
provision, the appropriate minimum contacts test for the constitutionality of that assertion of
jurisdiction, see note 25 supra, is not to measure the defendant's contacts with the state in
which the district court sits, but rather to measure the defendant's aggregate contacts with the
nation as a whole. See notes 149-60 and accompanying text infra.
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) (Securities Act); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (Sherman Act).
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found in any judicial district of the United States. 32 However, the fact
that they are appended to specific substantive statutes and applicable
only when those statutes are being enforced limits their scope.33 Indeed,
these substance-specific nationwide service provisions are used only to
facilitate the achievement of particularly weighty federal policy goals. 34
Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,35 which brought
nationwide service of process to the attention of the Supreme Court, pro-
vides a useful illustration of Rule 4's operation. In that case, each service
route allowed by Rule 4 failed to reach the third party defendants. A
private action under the Commodity Exchange Act,36 the suit was
brought in a Louisiana federal district court by investors against Omni
Capital International, Ltd. and Omni Capital Corporation (collectively
"Omni"), New York corporations that marketed a commodities futures
investment program. 37 Omni impleaded Rudolf Wolff & Co., a British
corporation employed by Omni to handle trades on the London Metals
Exchange, and James Gourlay, a British citizen who, as Wolff's repre-
sentative, solicited Omni's business. 38 Wolff and Gourlay moved to dis-
miss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.39 The
district court determined that the requirements of service of process were
not met and dismissed the claims.4° The Fifth Circuit affirmed, 4' and the
32 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) ("process ... may be served in any ... district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found"); id. § 5
("[Tihe court may cause [parties who, in the interest of justice, should be brought before the
court] to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not.").
Limits based on venue restrictions, however, still apply. See notes 122-25 and accompanying
text infra.
33 The scope of these statutory nationwide service of process provisions is further limited
by internal constraints on the application of many of them. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 5 (1982) (nationwide service of process provision applies only if court finds "that the ends of
justice require that other parties should be brought before the court"); Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982) (nationwide service of process provi-
sion applies only if "the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district
be brought before the court").
34 See Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Pro-
cess Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1243 (1987). "In stark contrast to the
general drift of the case law [imposing limits on the territorial reach of service of process],"
Sinclair explains, "the several statutes authorizing nationwide service in specific instances may
be seen as rare instances of express authority enacted to achieve goals perceived as para-
mount." Id.
35 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
36 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
37 Omni, 108 S. Ct. at 407.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 408.
41 Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari. 42 To determine whether service of
process was authorized, the Court turned to Rule 4.43
Wolff and Gourlay were not present in Louisiana,44 so Rule 4(f)'s
allowance of service on parties present within the forum state's territorial
boundaries could not be used.45 Nor were they found within one hun-
dred miles of the courthouse, frustrating any use of Rule 4(f)'s "bulge"
provision.46 Service under the state's long-arm statute, as allowed by
Rule 4(e),47 failed as well, because the Louisiana long-arm statute48 did
not reach the defendants.49 Therefore, service and personal jurisdiction
could only have been achieved by using a particular federal statutory
service provision.50 But while the Commodity Exchange Act provides
for nationwide service of process in certain types of actions, it does not
do so for private actions,51 either implicitly or explicitly.5 2 As a result,
the federal statute route to service under Rule 4 was no more successful
than any of the other avenues. Rule 4 thus provided no effective means
for serving a summons on the third party defendants.5 3
Omni attempted to circumvent Rule 4's limitations on service of
process by urging the Court to authorize extraterritorial service as a mat-
ter of federal common law.54 The Court, however, declined to do so 55
and held jurisdiction unobtainable over the foreign third party
defendants.5 6
As is clear from Omni, Rule 4, to a large extent, requires a federal
court to mimic a court of the state in which it is located-a requirement
not easily circumvented. State territorial boundaries therefore loom
large whenever a plaintiff in federal court attempts to serve a defendant
with a summons.
42 Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 479 U.S. 1063 (1987).
43 Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. CL 404, 409-11 (1987).
44 Id. at 407.
45 See id. at 409-10. The Court, of course, made no reference to any attempt to serve
process within Louisiana's borders.
46 See id. at 407. Because WVolff and Gourlay were impleaded pursuant to Rule 14, the
bulge provision was potentially applicable. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. The
Court did not mention any attempt to serve process pursuant to the bulge provision.
47 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
48 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:201 (West 1968) (current version at La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13:3201 (West Supp. 1989)).
49 Omni, 108 S. Ct. at 411.
50 See text accompanying note 29 supra. Both Rule 4(e) and Rule 4(f) authorize the use of
federal statutory service provisions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(f).
51 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 13a-1, 13a-2(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
52 Omni, 108 S. Ct. at 410-11.
53 Id. at 409-11, 413.
54 Id. at 409.
55 Id. at 411-13.
56 Id. at 413.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1989]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The result in Omni is problematic. Foreign defendants doing busi-
ness in the United States were in that case held unamenable to service
and thus unaccountable in the United States for alleged violations of fed-
eral law. The Court was not unsympathetic to this problem57 and in fact
commented on the need for nationwide jurisdiction in at least certain
federal question cases.58 While acknowledging the strong policy reasons
for asserting jurisdiction through nationwide service of process, however,
the Court held that such service was invalid in the absence of a specific
rule or statute.5 9 "It is not for the federal courts... to create such a rule
[authorizing nationwide service] as a matter of common law," the Court
wrote. "That responsibility, in our view, better rests with those who pro-
pose the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with Congress." 6 By
calling attention to the need and then declining to satisfy it, the Court
conveniently passed the buck.
The buck, it seems, stops with the federal rulemakers. Frankly ac-
knowledging the influence of the Supreme Court dictum, 6' the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules62 drafted a new Rule 4.63
B. Rule 4 as Proposed
1. Content of the Proposed Rule"
The revision of Rule 4 proposed by the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would change dramatically the territo-
rial limits of effective federal court service of process. First, the proposed
revision eliminates entirely sections 4(e) and 4(f) as they now stand. In
57 "We are not blind to the consequences of the inability to serve process," the Court
wrote. Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. The Court's suggestion that a federal rule of civil procedure could allow nationwide
long-arm jurisdiction was dictum. See Whitten, supra note 14, at 103 n.275. Nevertheless, the
current activity of the federal rulemakers indicates that the rulemakers take the dictum
seriously.
61 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Advisory Committee Notes at 30; Reporter's
Draft of Rule 4, 10-1-88, Reporter's Note at 1, Advisory Committee Notes at 28 (on file at
New York University Law Review) [hereinafter Reporter's Draft].
62 The advisory committee serves the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules.
Comprised of judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys, the advisory committee consid-
ers and revises drafts of proposed rules. See W. Brown, supra note 4, at 5.6, 9-25; Hazard,
supra note 4, 1284, 1284-85. For a general description of the rulemaking process, see note 4
supra. The current committee members are listed in 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5,
§ 1007.
63 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4, at 1-19. For a discussion of Rule 4 as
it stands now, see notes 21-34 and accompanying text supra.
64 For a discussion of an earlier draft of the proposed Rule 4, written by the rule's drafter,
see generally Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 733 (1988).
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their stead, the proposed rule puts forth three basic ideas. 65
First, the new rule preserves the one-hundred mile bulge for actions
under Rules 14 and 19.66 Second, in actions other than federal question
and interpleader cases, 67 it explicitly links federal court personal jurisdic-
tion to state court personal jurisdiction by providing that the federal
court may assert jurisdiction only when the corresponding state court
would be empowered to do so.6 8
Finally, and most importantly, the new rule permits nationwide ser-
vice of process in all federal question cases.69 Specifically, it provides:
Unless a statute of the United States otherwise provides, or the Consti-
tution in a specific application otherwise requires, service of a sum-
mons or filing of a waiver of service is also effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of any defendant against whom is asserted
a claim arising under federal law.70
If passed, this section will allow federal courts to assert personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question and interpleader cases7' over any defendant
65 The relevant text of the proposed rule reads as follows:
RULE 4 SUMMONS
(I) Territorial Limits of Effective Service.
(1) [S]ervice of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish juris-
diction over the person of a defendant who
(A) could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state in which the district court is held, or
(B) is a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and served at a place within a
judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from the place from
which the summons issues, or
(C) is subject to the federal interpleader jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
(2) Unless a statute of the United States otherwise provides, or the Constitution in a
specific application otherwise requires, service of a summons or filing of a naver of
service is also effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of any defendant against
whom is asserted a claim arising under federal law.
Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(l), at 14-16.
66 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(I)(1)(B), at 15.
67 What remains are all non-interpleader cases where subject matter jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (providing for subject matter jurisdic-
tion in diversity cases). Interpleader is a technique designed to prevent multiple liability by
which a debtor may require two or more adverse claimants to litigate their claims to the debt.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982); Dakota Livestock Co. v. Keim, 552 F.2d 1302, 1303, 1306 (8th
Cir. 1977).
68 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6. Rule 4(I)(1)(A), at 15.
69 Id. Rule 4(l)(2), at 15-16.
70 Id.
71 Nationwide service of process for interpleader is not a new development. Since 1917,
the Federal Interpleader Act, Act of February 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917), codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1982), has provided for such service. See R.
Casad, supra note 5, at § 3:27; 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5. at § 1701. For a
discussion of nationwide service of process in interpleader cases, see Fullerton, Constitutional
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 65-66
(1984).
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found anywhere in the United States. The new rule provides that "ser-
vice of a summons . . . [is] effective to establish jurisdiction over the
person."' 72 Service pursuant to the new rule, in turn, can be achieved "in
any judicial district of the United States."' 73 When read together, these
sections establish nationwide personal jurisdiction in all federal question
cases.
The proposed rule also facilitates overseas service. Whereas the cur-
rent Rule 4 limits service outside the United States to cases in which such
service is authorized by state or federal law,74 the new rule would allow
service abroad even in the absence of such statutory authorization. 75
Moreover, the new rule allows service in a foreign country even when
internationally agreed-upon means of service fail or are unavailable. 76
The proposed Rule 4 would thus serve as a federal long-arm statute for
72 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(I)(2), at 15-16.
73 Id. Rule 4(e), at 8; id. Rule 4(h), at 11. The relevant text pertaining to service upon
individuals reads as follows:
(e) Service upon Individuals within a Judicial District of the United States. Unless
otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual... may be effected in any
judicial district of the United States:
(1) pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held, or in which
service is effected.... ; or
(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual
personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place
of abode... or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Id. Rule 4(e), at 8-9.
The section governing service upon corporate defendants similarly allows nationwide
service:
(h) Service upon Corporations and Associations. Unless otherwise provided by federal
law, service upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unin-
corporated association which is subject to suit under a common name .. shall be ef-
fected
(1) in a judicial district of the United States in the manner prescribed for individuals
by paragraph (e)(1) of this rule or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process ....
Id. Rule 4(h), at 11.
74 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
75 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(f), at 9-10. See also id, Advisory Com-
mittee Notes at 26 (comparing overseas service provisions of current and proposed rules).
76 Id. Rule 4(f), (h), at 9-11. The relevant text reads as follows:
(f) Service upon Individuals in a Foreign Country. Unless otherwise provided by fed-
eral law, service upon an individual... may be effected in a foreign country:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such
as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents, provided, however, that, if service is not effected within
six months from the date on which the assistance of the government of the foreign coun-
try was requested pursuant to the applicable treaty or convention, service may be ef-
fected as directed by the court; or
(2) if internationally agreed means of service are unavailable, provided that service
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obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants."7
The preliminary draft of the Rule 4 revision is preceded by an inter-
esting note from the Advisory Committee.78 First, the prefatory Note
calls attention to the severability of paragraph (l)(2)-the nationwide
personal jurisdiction provision-from the remainder of the revised rule,
so that Congress can disapprove that provision while still approving the
many other Rule 4 amendments.79 Second and more significantly, the
Note recommends that if Congress does not disapprove paragraph (l)(2),
then Congress should amend the federal question jurisdiction statuteg° to
include a similar provision:
If this addition [paragraph (l)(2)] is not disapproved by Congress, it is
recommended that an amendment should be made to 28 U.s.C.
§ 1331, adding words as follows: "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States and, unless the Constitution in a spe-
cific application otherwise requires, jurisdiction over the person of de-
fendants in such actions." 81
This surprising preface to the proposed rule reflects the Advisory Com-
mittee's awareness of the fundamental nature of their revision.82 The
is reasonably calculated to give notice:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country... ; or
(B) as directed by the foreign authority ... ; or
(C) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by
(i) delivery to the individual personally... ; or
(ii) any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched
by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(iii) diplomatic or consular officers... ; or
(D) if there is no lawful means by which service can be effected in the foreign coun-
try, such means as the court shall direct.
(h) Service upon Corporations and Associations....
(2) in a foreign country in the manner prescribed for individuals by paragraph
(f)(1) or subparagraphs (f)(2)(A), (B) or (D) of this rule.
Id.
77 See Reporter's Draft, supra note 61, Advisory Committee Notes at 25.
Given the substantial increase in the number of international transactions and events
that are the subject of litigation in federal courts, it is appropriate now to infer a general
legislative authority to use familiar methods of service on defendants abroad, at least in
federal question cases. The considerations supporting the use of nationwide service of
process in such cases are equally applicable where an alleged wrongdoer is abroad.
Id. On the distinction between worldwide and nationwide personal jurisdiction, see note 6
supra.
78 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Note at 1.
79 "If paragraph (1)(2) of the proposed revision of Rule 4 is disapproved by the Congress, it
is nevertheless recommended that the rule be approved with the deletion of the paragraph,
which is separable from the revised rule...." Id.
90 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
81 Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Note at 1.
82 An earlier draft of the new rule proposed that the Advisory Committee make its recom-
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desired method of enacting nationwide personal jurisdiction, according
to the rulemakers, is through congressional statutory amendment.8 3
The new rule, in sum, would result in a dramatic expansion of ame-
nability to service of process. This expansion, in turn, would provide
important practical benefits.
2. Practical Benefits of the Proposed Rule
The new rule would facilitate the capture of personal jurisdiction
over defendants in three situations. The first is where a defendant is not
amenable to service of process in a given forum under a service provision
linked to state court service.84 In the second, a defendant has little or no
contact with the forum state. In such a situation, a due process test fo-
mendation of the nationwide personal jurisdiction provision contingent upon Congress's
amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to include a similar provision. See Reporter's Draft, supra note
61, at 16 n. 1. The notes to that draft explained: "Because this [nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion] effect has general consequences for the enforcement of federal law, it is proposed that one
sentence of the revised rule be enacted by Congress as an amendment to 28 U.S.C. 1331." Id.,
Advisory Committee Notes at 20.
Essentially, the earlier caveat amounted to a request for Congress to make its assent ex-
plicit, rather than tacit, as is the case for federal rulemaking generally. See note 4 supra. The
unusual call for explicit congressional approval in the earlier draft seemed to be driven by a
concern on the part of the rulemakers that so fundamental a rule may exceed their authority
under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). For a discussion of whether the
current proposal for nationwide personal jurisdiction exceeds the rulemakers' power, see text
accompanying notes 192-206 infra.
83 If Congress fails to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the rulemakers desire and disapproves
proposed paragraph (1)(2), but otherwise does not act to defeat the proposed Rule 4 amend-
ments, then the new Rule 4 would become effective with paragraph (1)(2) omitted. See Pro-
posed Amendments, supra note 6, Note at 1. While the language in sections 4(c) and 4(h)
would still authorize nationwide service of process, such service would not necessarily suffice
to create personal jurisdiction, because section 4(l)(1) states that service of a summons is "ef-
fective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant" only if the defendant "could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district
court is held," or if the defendant fits within the bulge or interpleader exceptions. Proposed
Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(l)(1), at 15.
Even if section 4(l)(2) were not approved, the remainder of the new rule would offer a
worthwhile clarification of federal practice in the service of summons, in that it offers a more
readable, coherent set of service provisions and makes service easier than under the current
Rule 4. See note 6 supra. It would not, however, represent a fundamental change in the
relationship between the state and federal courts. See notes 275-90 and accompanying text
infra.
If, on the other hand, Congress fails to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1331 but does not disapprove
proposed paragraph (1)(2) or the remainder of the proposed Rule 4 amendments, then the new
Rule 4 would become effective complete with its nationwide personal jurisdiction provision.
The enactment of a nationwide personal jurisdiction rule with only tacit congressional ap-
proval, however, may test the bounds of the rulemakers' authority under the Rules Enabling
Act. See note 82 supra; text accompanying notes 192-206 infra.
84 For example, the defendant might not be found within the state where the district court
sits, and there might be no applicable state long-arm statute. See text accompanying notes 22-
25 supra.
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cused on state boundaries would preclude the assertion of personal juris-
diction. 5 A court might nonetheless obtain personal jurisdiction under
the "aggregate contacts" due process test applicable under the new Rule
4.86 Facilitating the assertion of personal jurisdiction in these two situa-
tions is particularly important where a plaintiff asserts related claims
against several defendants, not all of whom would normally be subject to
jurisdiction in any one forum.87
The third situation where the new rule's importance manifests itself
is where a foreign defendant lacks minimum contacts with any particular
state, but has ample aggregate contacts with the United States as a
whole.88 A foreign corporation, for example, might do business in the
United States, but have that business spread thinly throughout the coun-
85 See text accompanying notes 14246 infra.
86 For a discussion of the "aggregate contacts" test for the constitutionality of assertions of
personal jurisdiction, see text accompanying notes 149-60 infra.
87 See, e.g., Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 857 (11th
Cir. 1988) (allowing jurisdiction over corporate defendant charged with antitrust violations,
but only over one of two individual defendants); Does 1-60 v. Republic Health Corp., 669 F.
Supp. 1511, 1517-18 (D. Nev. 1987) (allowing jurisdiction over all members of nationwide
RICO conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) because it was undisputed that there was at
least one defendant over which court had personal jurisdiction and no federal district in which
court would have personal jurisdiction over all defendants); Seahorse Boat & Barge Corp. v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 617 F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissing suit as to one of multiple
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction). See also notes 283-89 and accompanying text
inflra (regarding proposal for nationwide service of process in multiparty, multiforum cases).
Cf. Penn-Central Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 505 n.4 (1968) ("In these
circumstances, it would be senseless to permit parties seeking to challenge the merger and the
inclusion orders to bring numerous suits in many different courts."); CAT Aircraft Leasing,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 650 F. Supp. 57, 61 (D.V.1. 1986) (judicial policy favors litigating
related claims in same court).
88 See Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 426 (5th Cir. 1986) (sug-
gesting third party defendants lacked minimum contacts with any single state but had suffi-
dent contacts with entire nation), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
108 S. Ct. 404 (1987); id. at 428 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
According to the Advisory Committee Notes, the problem presented when defendants
have contacts spread thinly throughout the nation was part of the motivation for the Rule 4
proposal.
This subdivision corrects a hiatus in the enforcement of federal law. Under the former
rule, a problem was presented when the defendant was a non-resident of the United
States having contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the application of
United States law and to satisfy federal standards of forum selection, but having insuffi-
cient contact with any single state, or at least with the state in which the district court
sat, to support jurisdiction under state long-arm legislation or meet the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment limitation on state court territorial jurisdiction. In such
cases, the defendant was shielded from the enforcement of federal law by the fortuity of
a favorable limitation on the power of state courts which was incorporated into the
federal practice by the former rule. In this respect, the revision responds to the sugges-
tion of the Supreme Court made in Omni Capital Intern. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., Ltd.,
108 S. Ct. 404, 411 (1987).
Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Advisory Committee Notes at 30.
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try. In such a case, no single state exists where that corporation's con-
tacts are more than negligible, so personal jurisdiction in the United
States cannot be held constitutional under a state-linked due process
test.89 It could, however, be held constitutional under the aggregate con-
tacts test generally applied where personal jurisdiction is premised on
a nationwide service of process provision.90 The new rule would thus
allow assertions of jurisdiction over certain previously immune defen-
dants.
The rule also enhances the federal government's regulatory power
by increasing the power of the judicial system to enforce federal law.
The vindication of federal policy was a prime rationale behind federal
question subject matter jurisdiction.91 Expansive personal jurisdiction in
federal question cases is thus consonant with the federal question juris-
dictional grant, which attempts to provide an initial national forum for
effectuating national policy.92
The Supreme Court in Omni, while refusing to create a nationwide
service rule as a matter of common law, suggested this very concern. "A
narrowly tailored service of process provision," the Court wrote, "au-
thorizing service on an alien in a federal-question case when the alien is
not amenable to service under the applicable state long-arm statute,
might well serve the ends of the [Commodity Exchange Act] and other
federal statutes. ' 93 Although the Court seems not to have envisioned so
sweeping a change as the proposed Rule 4, it did take notice of the regu-
latory concerns underlying such a provision.
Finally, by facilitating assertions of jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rate defendants, the rule decreases jurisdictional trade disadvantages for
domestic corporations. American businesses can rarely avoid being sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in American courts, while foreign businesses
are able to do so more frequently. 94 This increases the litigation costs
89 See text accompanying notes 142-46 infra.
90 See text accompanying notes 149-60 infra.
91 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 159
(1953).
92 Cf. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I cannot understand the rationale for
imposing state legislative and territorial restraints on federal courts in a federal question case
involving a national policy, such as that embodied in the Commodities Exchange Act, calling
for national uniformity in enforcement."), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff &
Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
93 Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 413 (1987).
94 As Judge Wisdom noted when the Omni case was at the circuit court level, "the effect of
the majority's decision is to grant jurisdictional immunity to alien defendants who have done
business in this country thereby destroying any real possibility of holding them accountable for
their violation of federal statutes." Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 427 (Wisdom, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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(including costs of judgments, settlements, and attorneys' fees) of domes-
tic companies relative to the costs of foreign companies. As a result,
domestic companies are put at a comparative disadvantage in interna-
tional trade.95
3. Cases Affected by the Proposed Rule
The new rule would affect those federal question cases not already
covered by nationwide service provisions where the defendant is servable
by and only by nationwide service of process. This general classification
of cases affected by the new rule can best be demonstrated by process of
elimination.
First, the class of cases affected must exclude cases not arising under
federal law, since by its own terms the rule applies only to federal ques-
tion eases.96 Second, the class must exclude cases in which nationwide
service is already authorized by statute, since in those cases the rule con-
tributes nothing new.97 Third, the class must exclude those cases in
which the defendant is already amenable to service of process under the
current provisions of Rule 4, that is, present within the state boundaries,
reachable under the state long-arm statute, or servable pursuant to the
one-hundred mile bulge provision.98 In those cases as well, the rule is
unnecessary. Finally, the class must exclude cases in which the court is
unable constitutionally to assert personal jurisdiction over the relevant
party, even under a nationwide service provision. For example, a court
could not assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who lacks mini-
mum contacts with the United States as a whole.99
This description may seem to depict a very tightly circumscribed
class of cases. On closer examination, however, the class proves to be of
substantial size. This is true because the second exclusion, where nation-
wide service is independently authorized, and the fourth exclusion, where
personal jurisdiction would be unconstitutional, are narrow categories.
The former is narrow in that only a small proportion of all federal stat-
utes contain nationwide service provisions. 10 The latter is narrow be-
95 Cf. H.R. 3662, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (bill proposing worldwide process for prod-
ucts liability actions against foreign defendants); 133 Cong. Rec. H10,785 (1987) (statement of
Rep. Dan Glickman) (products liability jurisdiction bill was, in part, attempt to eliminate dis-
advantages to American businesses stemming from lack of domestic jurisdiction over foreign
businesses).
96 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(I)(2), at 15-16.
97 See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
98 See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
99 See notes 149-60, 218-21 and accompanying text infra.
100 One commentator refers to "the glacial growth of specific statutes expressly providing
for nationwide service." Sinclair, supra note 34, at 1241. But see Fullerton, supra note 71, at 4
("While the first few nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes only applied in narrow circum-
stances, in recent years Congress has permitted nationwide jurisdiction in a much broader
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cause the constitutional requirement of aggregate minimum contacts
with the United States 01 is an easy one to meet. 10 2
One example of a case in which the new rule would have affected the
personal jurisdiction determination is Omni.10 3 Had the proposed Rule 4
been in effect when the Omni case was brought, the district court could
have obtained personal jurisdiction over the third party defendants.
Their aggregate contacts through doing business in the United States
probably would have sufficed to make the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion constitutional.'14 Since the case was brought under a federal statute,
personal jurisdiction would have been obtained through the express au-
thorization of nationwide service of process in the new Rule 4.
Another illustrative example is the district court case of Martin v.
Delaware Law School of Widener University.105 In that case, a former
law student brought suit in federal district court in Delaware against,
among others, the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners and two Penn-
sylvania judges. 10 6 The plaintiff alleged that these defendants violated his
civil rights107 by refusing to admit him to the bar and by "issu[ing] orders
against him" when he tried to counter an alleged "disinformation
scheme" his college had pursued against him.108 The three Pennsylvania
defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the District Court of
Delaware lacked personal jurisdiction over them. °9 The court looked to
Rule 4 to determine whether service of process was authorized and thus
whether the court could assert personal jurisdiction: "In order for this
Court to exercise jurisdiction over these defendants, this service must be
adequate under the provisions of F.R.C.P. Rule 4(e) or 4(f)."'110 The
defendants were not present within the state of Delaware, nor were they
servable under any federal statute.11" ' Also, because they had essentially
no contacts with Delaware,112 they did not fall within the reach of the
array of cases.").
101 See notes 149-60 and accompanying text infra.
102 See text accompanying note 221 infra.
103 For a discussion of the Omni case, see text accompanying notes 35-60 supra.
104 See Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 1986) (Wis-
dom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987). The Supreme Court declined to decide the question of
aggregate contacts. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 408-09 n.5
(1987).
105 625 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Del. 1985).
106 Id. at 1292.
107 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Martin, 625 F.
Supp. at 1292.
108 Id. at 1293.
109 Id. at 1294.
110 Id.
III Id.
112 Id. at 1295.
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Delaware long-arm statute. a13 The court therefore dismissed the claims
against these defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.11 4
Had the proposed Rule 4 been in effect, the Martin court would
have been able to obtain personal jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania de-
fendants.115 Because the case arose under federal law,'" 6 it would have
fallen within the new rule's scope.117 Since the defendants resided in
Pennsylvania,II 8 which is, of course, "in any judicial district of the
United States," 119 service would have been proper under the new Rule
4.120 Moreover, under the new Rule 4's nationwide service of process
provision, the assertion of jurisdiction would have been constitutional.
By virtue of their residence in Pennsylvania, the defendants would have
had sufficient contacts with the United States to meet the aggregate con-
tacts test of due process.121
The new rule would affect the cases discussed above in that personal
jurisdiction could be asserted where it previously had been unavailable.
But in assessing the rule's true impact, one must look not only to per-
sonal jurisdiction, but more broadly to where suits ultimately could be
litigated. Venue, as a further practical limitation on forum selection,
must therefore be considered.
The most important practical limitation on where suits ultimately
can be litigated, other than personal jurisdiction, is venue. Under the
federal venue statute,1 22 venue in federal question cases is limited and
defendant-oriented. A federal question action can be brought only in the
district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose. 123
113 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104 (1975). See Martin, 625 F. Supp. at 1294-95.
114 Martin, 625 F. Supp. at 1294-95.
115 It should be noted that although the district court in Delaware would have obtained
personal jurisdiction over these defendants, venue in the District of Delaware would nonethe-
less have been improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the defendants resided in Penn-
sylvania and the claims against them arose in Pennsylvania. See id. at 1294 (venue improper).
Thus, while the new rule would expand the reach of federal courts' personal jurisdiction, its
practical impact would be significantly limited by venue restrictions. See text accompanying
notes 122-31 infra.
116 Subject matter jurisdiction was founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and
1343 (civil rights).117 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(I)(2), at 15-16.
118 Martin, 625 F. Supp. at 1294.119 Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(e), at 8, and 4(h), at 11.
120 Indeed, in holding that the Pennsylvania defendants were not amenable to service of
process, the court in Martin commented that no authorization for nationwide service of proc-
ess was present. Martin, 625 F. Supp. at 1294.
121 See text accompanying notes 149-60 infra.
122 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982).
123 See id. § 1391(b). Venue in federal question cases is more restrictive than venue in di-
versity cases. Compare id. (venue in federal question cases based on residence of all defendants
or where claim arose) with id. § 1391(a) (venue in diversity cases based on residence of all
plaintiffs, all defendants, or where claim arose). This differential makes little sense under the
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This statutory venue limitation severely restricts a plaintiff's ability
to sue out-of-state defendants. A defendant's amenability to service of
process makes possible the assertion of personal jurisdiction, but does not
in itself guarantee the plaintiff's ability to bring suit in a particular fo-
rum. Venue requirements also must be met.124 In a district where the
venue requirements are not met, suit cannot be brought, even if personal
jurisdiction has been properly asserted through nationwide service of
process. 125
For corporate defendants, the venue limitation is of less conse-
quence than for individual defendants. Until recently, the federal corpo-
rate venue statute defined a corporation's "residence" for venue purposes
as "any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do busi-
ness or is doing business."1 26 Venue based on the defendant's "resi-
dence" was therefore comparatively easily met for corporate defendants.
A recent amendment to the venue statute makes corporate venue
even less restrictive. 127 The new statute explicitly links venue to personal
jurisdiction. "For purposes of venue under this chapter," it provides, "a
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the ac-
present Rule 4, see C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 240 (4th ed. 1983), but would become
entirely rational (in its effect, if not its cause) were there to be nationwide service of process in
all federal question cases in federal courts, since the venue limitations of § 1391(b) would
protect defendants from having to litigate in inconvenient forums.
Completely defendant-oriented venue would not include venue where the claim arose, but
rather would be limited to venue where defendant resides or is found. Thus § 1391(b), while
relatively restrictive and defendant-oriented, is not as restrictive as it could be.
124 Cf. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 869 (1963) ("Those
changes [to Rule 4, allowing use of state long-arm statutes,] will apparently have little effect
insofar as 'federal question' litigation is concerned, since 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) requires such
suits to be brought 'only in the judicial district where all defendants reside. .. .' ").
The venue restriction may explain why there have been few constitutional challenges to
statutory nationwide service of process provisions.
125 Specialized venue provisions attached to federal statutes can function similarly as limits
on the assertion of judicial authority. See, e.g., Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d
668, 672 (7th Cir. 1987) (RICO venue provision probably did not authorize venue in Illinois,
although personal jurisdiction was properly asserted through nationwide service of process),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1472 (1988). Cf. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir.
Unit A July 1981) (finding that Federal Trade Commission Act implicitly authorizes nation-
wide service of process, because "Congress would not have limited the permissible venues for
F.T.C. enforcement actions unless it contemplated extra-territorial service of process"). In-
deed, such venue provisions can be used precisely to provide wider or narrower forum options,
depending on the policies underlying the particular federal statute. See notes 240-45 and ac-
companying text infra.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) (amended 1988). On the definition of "doing business" for
venue purposes, see note 235 infra.
127 Compare id. (previous version) with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1989) (amended
version).
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tion is commenced."1 28 In other words, once personal jurisdiction has
been established, venue imposes no additional limitation on where suits
against only corporate defendants may be brought. 29
Because the new corporate venue statute links venue to personal ju-
risdiction, a nationwide personal jurisdiction provision would expand
venue dramatically for corporate defendants. Under the proposed Rule
4, if the new corporate venue statute remains in effect, venue in federal
question actions against corporate defendants would be proper in any
United States judicial district.130
Venue, in sum, would sharply restrict the practical effect of the pro-
posed nationwide personal jurisdiction rule on individual defendants.
The rule's impact would therefore be smaller than one might imagine.
Nationwide personal jurisdiction in all federal question cases does not
mean that all federal question suits may be brought in any judicial dis-
trict. But because the newly amended corporate venue statute links
venue to personal jurisdiction, under the proposed nile, venue restric-
tions would provide no such protection to corporate defendants. Those
defendants, unlike individual defendants, would indeed be subject to suit
nationwide. Unless the new corporate venue statute is amended 131 the
most significant limitation on nationwide personal jurisdiction-that of
venue-will be meaningless to corporate defendants.
The expansion of the personal jurisdictional reach of the federal
courts in federal question cases through the new Rule 4 would bring
practical benefits. Nevertheless, the proposed rule is vulnerable to a
number of criticisms. These criticisms, based on constitutionality, proce-
dure, and policy, must now be examined in order to gain a complete
128 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) (amended 1988).
129 If, however, a plaintiff sues joint defendants, corporate and individual-rather than a
sole corporate defendant or multiple corporate defendants-venue does limit forum options.
Because § 1391(b) allows venue only where the claim arose or where all defendants reside, suit
could be brought only where the claim arose or where the individual defendant resides, despite
the broad new corporate venue statute.
130 This combination ofnationwide service and jurisdiction-linked venue would give a wind-
fall tactical advantage to plaintiffs. An Alaskan plaintiff, for example, might sue a New York
corporate defendant on a federal question claim in federal court in Alaska. The proposed Rule
4 would authorize the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant in the Alaska federal court.
Venue would fail to protect the defendant from the inconvenience of Alaskan litigation, since
under the new corporate venue statute, venue is proper wherever personal jurisdiction is
proper. The defendant, of course, could request venue transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. But these doctrines are discretionary. The plain-
tiff will have gained a substantial bargaining edge in settlement negotiations, since the defen-
dant may well prefer plaintiff's demands to the prospect of litigating in Alaska. For further
discussion of the use of inconvenient litigation for harassment, see text accompanying notes
207-11 infra.
131 This Note proposes that the corporate venue statute be amended if the new Rule 4 is
adopted. See notes 234-35 and accompanying text infra.
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understanding of the new rule.
II
AN UNCONVINCING RESPONSE:
ATTACKING THE RULE'S VALIDITY
A. Constitutional Attack
Critics of the proposed rule132 would argue that nationwide personal
jurisdiction is unconstitutional. More precisely, they would argue that
jurisdiction under the rule would be unconstitutional if the defendant
lacked minimum contacts with the forum state. The constitutional at-
tack on the proposed rule's validity begins with an examination of state
court personal jurisdiction doctrine. 133
Traditional personal jurisdiction dogma focused on the themes of
power and territoriality.134 In the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff,135
the Supreme Court established the notion that the defendant's physical
presence within the state-and thus the state's physical power over the
defendant-was a prerequisite to the court's assertion of personal juris-
diction over the defendant. 136 "The authority of every tribunal," the
Court declared, "is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the
State in which it is established." 137
Over the next seven decades, courts extended personal jurisdiction
beyond mere in-state physical presence to such limited situations as "im-
plied consent"1 38 and in-state domicile. 139 The basic power theory of
personal jurisdiction, 140 however, remained intact until the Supreme
132 The proposal for amending Rule 4 is too new to have given rise to published criticisms.
The "critics" of the proposed rule discussed in this Note are, for that reason, largely hypotheti-
cal. Their arguments, however, are derived by extrapolation from closely analogous articles
and opinions. The attacks discussed anticipate the criticisms most likely to be leveled against
the new rule.
133 For general discussions of the history of personal jurisdiction in the state courts, see 4 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5, §§ 1064-1067; Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 39-62 (1978); Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism
in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 689-733 (1987).
134 See R. Casad, supra note 5, § 4:02; 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5, § 1064.
135 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
136 See id. at 720.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (non-resident defendant's operation
of motor vehicle within state constituted implied consent to jurisdiction).
139 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (domicile in state held sufficient to
bring absent defendant within reach of state's jurisdiction for purposes of personal judgment
by means of appropriate substituted service).
140 The power theory premises personal jurisdiction on a sovereign's authority to adjudicate
the rights and responsibilities of those within that sovereign's power. See von Mehren, Adjudi-
catory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 279, 285
(1983).
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Court decided International Shoe Co. v. Washington ' 41 in 1945.
The International Shoe Court rejected the Pennoyer obsession with
power. The Court held that personal jurisdiction was not premised ex-
clusively on notions of sovereignty; rather, personal jurisdiction de-
pended upon "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,' 42
including "an estimate of the inconveniences" to the defendant.143 The
"minimum contacts" 144 approach to personal jurisdiction derived from
this analysis, 145 and the progeny of International Shoe firmly established
minimum contacts as the guiding principle of personal jurisdiction. 41
Some commentators and judges, looking at this historical evolution
of state court personal jurisdiction doctrine, argue that federal court per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon nationwide service of process is constitu-
tional only if that assertion of jurisdiction is "fair" as the term is used in
International Shoe.147 According to this view, personal jurisdiction is
based on fairness rather than sovereignty. If it is unfair to require a de-
fendant to appear in a given state court, surely it is equally unfair to
require her to appear in the federal court across the street.1 48 Therefore,
personal jurisdiction in federal court is unconstitutional wherever it
would be unconstitutional in the corresponding state court-that is,
141 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
142 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Chief Justice Stone's
much cited passage bears repeating:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonata, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id.
143 Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L.
Hand, J.)).
144 Id. at 316.
145 See Friedenthal, supra note 3, § 3.10.
146 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,223 (1957).
147 See, eg., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198 (F-D. Pa.
1974); Fullerton, supra note 71, at 62; Lusardi, supra note 30, at 324 Note, Pendent Personal
Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L Rev. 113, 125 (1989).
148 See Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Pro-
cess, 8 Viii. L. Rev. 520, 533-34 (1963). Professor Abraham states the argument as follows:
If a defendant is forced to litigate in the courts of a distant state with which he has had
no contact, it is considered so unfair to him as to offend the "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Might it not also be unfair to force him to litigate in the federal court
across the street? Might this unfairness not offend the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" embodied in the due process clause of the fifth amendment?
Id. See also Stephens, The Federal Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal
Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. Rich. L Rev. 697, 697 (1984) (discussing
Abraham's argument).
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wherever the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the state in which
the federal district court sits.
This constitutional attack on the nationwide personal jurisdiction
provision is misplaced because it depends on a faulty analogy of state
court jurisdiction to federal court jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction in
the federal courts differs fundamentally from personal jurisdiction in the
state courts. 149 The federal courts exercise the "judicial Power of the
United States,"' 150 not the judicial power of the state in which the court
sits. "Because the district court's jurisdiction is always potentially...
co-extensive with the boundaries of the United States," the Fifth Circuit
has explained, "due process requires only that a defendant in a federal
suit have minimum contacts with the United States, 'the sovereign that
has created the court.' "151 A majority of the circuit courts that have
considered the issue have held that the defendant's aggregate contacts
with the entire United States provide the measure of minimum contacts
necessary for personal jurisdiction in the federal courts in those cases
where nationwide service of process is provided. 152
149 In the federal courts, it is the fifth amendment's due process clause at issue, rather than
that of the fourteenth amendment. See In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341, 1344
(I lth Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782
(1989); Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub
nom. Grim Hotel v. Brock, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985). The distinction between the two amend-
ments is of little consequence in itself, however. Their divergent applications in the context of
personal jurisdiction results not from their distinct locations in the Constitution, but rather
from the distinction between federal and state courts.
15o U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
151 FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (quoting
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting on other grounds)). But
see Burstein v. State Bar of Calif., 693 F.2d 511, 515-16 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (questioning vital-
ity of Jim Walter sovereignty analysis).
152 See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir.
1985); Jim Walter, 651 F.2d at 256; Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979);
Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir.
1974). See also Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 825 (6th Cir. 1981) (where
nationwide service provided, due process requires only reasonable notice), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 949 (1982). This view has been expressed in numerous other opinions as well. See, e.g.,
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting on other grounds); Stein-
berg & Lyman v. Takacs, 690 F. Supp. 263, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Sparkowich v. American
S.S. Owner's Mut. Protection and Indemnity Ass'n, 687 F. Supp. 695, 698 n.6 (D. Me. 1988);
Whistler Corp. v. Solar Elects., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (D. Mass. 1988); Entek Corp. v.
Southwest Pipe & Supply Co., 683 F. Supp. 1092, 1099-1101 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Prospect Hill
Resources, Inc. v. Chenoweth, 69 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F.
Supp. 436, 438-39 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 1354,
1358 n.6 (D. Kan. 1983), appeal dismissed, 776 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Point
Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 1986) (Wisdom, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("In a federal question action, aggregating a defendant's na-
tional contacts is analogous to aggregating state contacts in a diversity case."), aff'd sub nom.
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987); Max Daetwyler Corp. v.
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This aggregate contacts approach follows naturally from the mini-
mum contacts approach used in state court personal jurisdiction. The
minimum contacts doctrine requires that, in order for an assertion of
jurisdiction to be constitutionally permissible, there be suffcient contacts
between the defendant and the forum.15 3 In a state court case, the forum
is the state. In a federal question case in federal court, however, the
forum is properly understood to be the United States.154 In Judge Eas-
terbrook's words, "The question is whether the polity, whose power the
court wields, possesses a legitimate claim to exercise force over the defen-
dant."'155 Because a federal court in a federal question case is not imple-
menting any state's policy, but is rather exercising the power of the
country as a whole, its jurisdictional reach should be conceived in
national terms.156
Article III of the Constitution empowers Congress to establish fed-
eral courts below the Supreme Court as it deems appropriate. 5 7 Con-
gress could have established only one federal district-a nationwide
one-with jurisdiction running throughout that district.' 58 In other
words, federal districts need not have been defined in terms of state
boundaries. 159 As far as exercise of the federal judicial power is con-
Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir.) (dictum), cert. deijied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
One circuit has indicated in general terms a reluctance to adopt the aggregate contacts
approach. See Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Chase &
Sanborn, 835 F.2d at 1344 n.8 (noting lack of consensus). See generally Fullerton, supra note
71, at 5, 14-22 (discussing with disapproval development of aggregate contacts approach).
According to Wright and Miller, the aggregate contacts approach was first suggested in
Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 Vand. L Rev.
967, 981 (1961). 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5, at § 1067.1.
The Supreme Court has declined to address explicitly the constitutionality of personal
jurisdiction based on aggregate contacts with the United States. See Omni, 108 S. CL at 408-
09 n.5; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987).
153 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); World-Vide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
154 See Haile, 657 F.2d at 825; Jim Walter, 651 F.2d at 256; Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 333;
Driver, 577 F.2d at 156 n.25; Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143.
155 Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1472 (1988).
156 Id. Conceiving federal court personal jurisdiction in national terms may be problematic
where a pendent state claim is joined with the federal question claim. In particular, a plaintiff
may attach a state claim to a bogus federal claim, and thus use a nationwide service provision
to obtain personal jurisdiction on the state claim in a forum where it would otherwise have
been impermissible. One possible solution to this problem would be severance of the state and
federal claims in such situations. For a discussion of exactly this problem and potential solu-
tions, see Note, supra note 147.
157 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
158 See United States v. Union Pac. R.R, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 569, 603-04 (1878) (Congress
may make court in District of Columbia exclusive forum for certain claims arising under fed-
eral law).
159 Id. But see Sinclair, supra note 34, at 1241-42 (emphasizing significance of actual-
rather than potential-federal district prescriptions, which have been based on state territorial
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cerned, state boundaries are given no significance by the Constitution. 60
The discussion in recent personal jurisdiction cases about fairness 16'
should not be taken to establish that personal jurisdiction is no longer
concerned with sovereignty. 162 "Fairness" has become almost a required
incantation in every jurisdictional analysis.163 But that incantation can
refer either to convenience or to sovereignty; it is meaningless without
further inquiry. While some have treated the references to "fairness" as
evidence of a judicial focus on convenience, 16 "fairness" in the jurisdic-
tional sense can also address how much power the sovereign is to be
accorded. 165 A state court can constitutionally take personal jurisdic-
tion, according to this conception, where it is "fair" to consider the de-
fendant to have submitted herself to that state's limited sovereignty.
Similarly,. a federal court constitutionally may assert personal jurisdic-
tion where it is fair to consider the defendant to have submitted herself to
boundaries).
160 See Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (lst Cir. 1984)
(" '[Mjinimum contacts' with a particular district or state for purposes of personal jurisdiction
is not a limitation imposed on the federal courts in a federal question case by due process
concerns. The Constitution does not require the federal districts to follow state boundaries.").
Cf. Lisak, 834 F.2d at 671 ("[T]here is no constitutional obstacle to nationwide service of
process in the federal courts in federal-question cases.").
161 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74, 477-78 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 424-25, 428 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980) (stressing
personal jurisdiction's concern with "interstate federalism" and with states' "status as coequal
sovereigns"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (restrictions on personal jurisdic-
tion are "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States"). But
see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guin6e, 456 U.S. 694, 702-04
(1982) (focusing on individual liberty interest, rather than sovereignty, as heart of fourteenth
amendment personal jurisdiction doctrine).
163 See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74, 477-78; Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 424-25, 428 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
864 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 872 F.2d 423 (1989), petition for cert. filed (June 26,
1989); American Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1167 (6th Cir. 1988); Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 428 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct.
683 (1989).
164 See Douglas Battery Mfg. Co. v. Taylor Auto Supply, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1072, 1074
(M.D.N.C. 1982); Dexter Shoe Co. v. Chippewa Shoe Co., 209 U.S.P.Q. 719, 720-24 (D. Me.
1980); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
165 The Seventh Circuit analyzed the fairness question as follows:
[T]he "fairness" standard imposed by Shaffer relates to the fairness of the exercise of
power by a particular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating in
a distant forum. Applying this standard of fairness, it is clear that this instance of per-
sonal service [under the nationwide service provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934] satisfies Due Process. Here the sovereign is the United States, and there can be no
question but that the defendant, a resident citizen of the United States, has sufficient
contacts with the United States to support the fairness of the exercise ofjurisdiction over
him by a United States court.
Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the United States's sovereignty.166 Because the sovereign power of the
United States extends over a far wider territory than the sovereign power
of any given state, it is fair to consider the jurisdictional reach of the
federal courts to be broader than that of any state court.
Admittedly, merely redefining "fairness" does nothing to avoid the
confusion inherent in the word.167 The essence of personal jurisdiction
cannot be found in facile incantations. But neither does the talismanic
use of "fairness" prove that convenience is at the heart of jurisdictional
due process.
Cases involving the one hundred mile bulge provision of Rule 4(f)
provide an obstacle to those who argue that state boundaries provide
bright lines of demarcation and thus that nationwide service would vio-
late constitutional norms by ignoring those boundaries. Such cases
demonstrate that a federal court constitutionally may exercise personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant has no
contacts with the state in which the district court SitS. 1 68 As long as the
defendant has sufficient contacts with the bulge area, personal jurisdic-
tion exercised pursuant to service under the bulge provision meets due
process standards. 169
Additionally, the argument for due process limitations on nation-
wide personal jurisdiction fails to recognize the distinction between sov-
ereignty as a limit on personal jurisdiction and sovereignty as the engine
of personal jurisdiction. The International Shoe line of cases established
that territorial sovereignty was not an absolute limitation on a court's
jurisdictional reach.' 70 A court could reach beyond the territorial
boundaries of the sovereign that created the court, as long as that reach
comported with due process notions of fairness. But those cases did not
reject the idea that, at least where the power of the sovereign is clear,
such sovereignty suffices to grant jurisdiction.17 ' In other words, sover-
166 See FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255-56 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
167 See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 164 (1986) (term "fairness" is "somewhat arbitrary" and
its use varies with user); cf. J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, ch. V, sem. 6, n.b, in A
Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government 392, 494-96 (J. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart eds. 1977) (discussing difficulties inherent in defining abstract terms).
168 See Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1172-78 (10th Cir. 1986);
Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1968).
169 See Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1172-78; Sprow, 594 F.2d at 417. See also Coleman, 405 F.2d
at 252 (minimum contacts with entire state in which bulge service occurred are sufficient).
170 See, e*g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1985); McGee v. In-
ternational Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
171 It might be argued that, while the in personam cases discussed above did not reject
sovereignty as a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), did. In Shaffer, the Supreme Court held that the mere presence of property in a state
does not suffice to make the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction constitutional; a plaintiff must
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eignty is not necessary for personal jurisdiction, but it is sufficient.' 72
In sum, while constitutional concerns may limit slightly the applica-
tion of the proposed rule to prevent egregious inconvenience, the more
general constitutional attack on the validity of the proposed rule does not
withstand scrutiny. Even if they were to grant the constitutionality of a
provision authorizing nationwide service of process in federal question
cases, opponents of the proposed Rule 4 might nevertheless argue, on
procedural grounds, that the rule is not a legitimate means of achieving
such a goal.
B. Procedural Attack
Procedural attacks upon the adoption of the proposed rule might be
premised on Rule 82173 or on the Rules Enabling Act.' 74 These attacks
would posit that the federal rulemakers may legitimately use Rule 4 to
regulate service of process, but not to revamp personal jurisdiction.1 75
establish that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. at 212. The
minimum contacts doctrine was thus, for the first time, used to restrict jurisdiction, whereas
previously it had been used only to expand it. This view of Shaffer suggests that personal
jurisdiction based solely on defendant's transient presence in state ("tag" jurisdiction), see, e.g.,
Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116, 119 (1873), may no longer be constitutionally viable. See
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Duehr-
ing v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1986); Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death War-
rant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 38, 60-68 (1979);
Silberman, supra note 133, at 75-76 n.236.
Central to Shaffer, though, was the issue of jurisdictional attachment. The Court recog-
nized that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction really concerns the rights and duties of people, not prop-
erty. For that reason, it held that attachment jurisdiction must be subjected to a minimum
contacts analysis. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. Viewed in this light, Shaffer did not reject
sovereignty over the individual as a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. Physical presence
in a state probably remains a sound basis for personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amusement
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985); Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748,
755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Hutto v. Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, 513, 330 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1985). See
also R. Casad, supra note 5, § 4:11 (listing cases upholding physical presence as valid basis for
asserting jurisdiction). Instead, Shaffer simply recognized that power over property does not
necessarily imply power over the owner. See Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 734, 273
S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980).
Even if it were true that Shaffer eliminated "tag" jurisdiction by requiring minimum con-
tacts in every case, that would not imply that jurisdiction based on nationwide service of pro-
cess would, in order to be constitutional, also require minimum contacts with the forum state.
The relevant boundaries are those of "the sovereign that has created the court." Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion in federal court is constitutional if the defendant has minimum contacts with the United
States, see text accompanying notes 149-60 supra, despite the possible invalidity of "tag" juris.
diction after Shaffer.
172 See R. Casad, supra note 5, § 4:04.
173 Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.
174 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
175 See Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 429 (5th Cir. 1986) (Wis-
dom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Rule 4 provides the mechanics for service
of process. It has no necessary relation with a court's acquiring personal jurisdiction."), aff'd
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Responding to these arguments requires an understanding of the interre-
lationship between service of process and personal jurisdiction. Service
of process is the ritual by which a court asserts personal jurisdiction over
a party.176 Without valid service, there is no personal jurisdiction. 1 7
Therefore, while service of a summons is not equivalent to jurisdiction,
the two are inextricably linked.
Rule 4 contains two types of provisions: mechanical and jurisdic-
tional. The mechanical provisions delineate how process can be
served.178 The jurisdictional provisions delineate where or on whom pro-
cess can be served. 179 It is possible to imagine a service rule that contains
only mechanical provisions. Such a rule would only govern when service
may be made,180 who may deliver the summons,181 how the mail may be
used,18 2 and other such requirements regarding how process is to be
served. The rule would not address where or on whom process may be
served, but would leave these jurisdictional matters for some other rule
or statute.
Rule 4, however, is not such a purely mechanical rule, nor has it
ever been. The rule included jurisdictional provisions at its first appear-
ance in 1938.183 Section 4(f) of the original rule authorized service of
process "anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the
district court is held"'" or pursuant to a federal long-arm statute.'85
sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. C. 404 (1987).
176 See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 5, § 1063 ("The primary function of Rule 4 is to
provide the mechanism for bringing notice of the commencement of an action to defendant's
attention and to provide a ritual that marks the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the
lawsuit.").
177 See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 409 (1987) (f[Blefore a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice to
the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the fo-
rum. There also must be a basis for the defendant's amenability to service of summons.");
Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 847 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(citing Omni); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Service
of process is how a court gets jurisdiction over the person."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1472
(1988).
178 E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a) (issuance of summons by clerk); id. Rule 4(c)(2)(A) (service by
any nonparty over 18 years of age); id. Rule 4(d)(1) (delivery to "dwelling house or usual place
of abode").
179 E.g., id. Rule 4(e)(1) (service pursuant to state long-arm provision); id. Rule 4(f) (ser-
vice within state's territorial limits; one-hundred mile bulge provision).
180 See id. Rule 40).
181 See id. Rule 4(c)(1)-(2)(B).
182 See id. Rule 4(e)(2)(C)(il).
183 See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645,
667 (1937) [hereinafter 1938 Rules]; Whitten, supra note 14, at 72-73.
184 1938 Rules, supra note 183, at 667. Previously, a federal court could serve process only
within its own district, absent an applicable federal long-arm statute. See Whitten, supra note
14, at 70-72.
185 1938 Rules, supra note 183, at 667.
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1. Rule 82
One possible procedural argument against the adoption of the pro-
posed Rule 4 is that Rule 82 prohibits the federal rules of civil procedure
from expanding or restricting jurisdiction. 18 6 Rule 82 provides, "These
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein."' t8 7 That
provision, opponents of the new Rule 4 might argue, makes it inappropri-
ate for any federal rule of civil procedure to grant nationwide personal
jurisdiction to the federal district courts.
Although Rule 82 has provoked some confusion in the federal
courts, 88 the fallacy of erecting it as a barrier to a nationwide service
rule becomes clear upon analysis. A proper understanding of Rule 82
requires an appreciation of the distinction between subject matter juris-
diction and personal jurisdiction.1 89 Rule 82 applies only to the for-
mer.190 Therefore, while it is true that the federal rules of civil procedure
may not determine issues of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it does
not follow that they may not extend or limit federal personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, Rule 4's effects on the limits of personal jurisdiction-quite aside
from the nationwide service proposal-are manifest.' 9'
2. The Rules Enabling Act
A second and more potent procedural attack upon the new Rule 4 is
that the Rules Enabling Act1 92 forbids the federal rulemakers to expand
186 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guin~e, 456 U.S. 694, 715
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (because of Rule 82, Rule 37 should not be considered grant of
personal jurisdiction); Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 429 (5th Cir.
1986) (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (because of Rule 82, Rule 4
should not be construed to limit personal jurisdiction of federal courts), aff'd sub nom. Omni
Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1948) (Johnsen, J., concurring) (because of Rule 82, Rule
23(a) may not affect personal jurisdiction).
187 Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.
188 See note 186 supra.
189 See note 1 supra (defining subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction).
190 See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946); Quinones v.
Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1175 n.6 (10th Cir. 1986); Ransom v. Brennan,
437 F.2d 513, 517 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971); Paxton v. Southern Pa. Bank, 93 F.R.D. 503, 505 (D.
Md. 1982). In the words of the Supreme Court,
it is evident that Rule 4(f) and Rule 82 must be construed together, and that the Advi-
sory Committee, in doing so, has treated Rule 82 as referring to venue and jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the district courts .... rather than the means of bringing the
defendant before the court already having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Mississippi Publishing Corp., 326 U.S. at 445.
191 Consider, for example, the bulge provision of Rule 4(f), which extends the personal
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond state lines in actions pursuant to Rule 14 and Rule 19.
See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
192 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
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or restrict substantive rights.1 93 The Rules Enabling Act empowers the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil procedure,194 but includes a
much discussed caveat:195 "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or mod-
ify any substantive right."' 96 A nationwide personal jurisdiction provi-
sion, critics might argue, would enlarge the right of plaintiffs to sue in
federal court and simultaneously abridge the right of defendants to avoid
inconvenient litigation. Such a rule would exceed the authority of the
Supreme Court and the federal rulemakers, and would therefore be
invalid.
To argue that personal jurisdiction or freedom therefrom constitutes
a "substantive right" within the meaning of the Act is to disregard the
history of the federal rules.197 Such a position ignores Rule 4's tradi-
tional extensions of personal jurisdiction, such as Rule 4(e)'s authoriza-
tion of the use of state long-arm statutes' 93 and Rule 4(f)'s bulge
provision. 199 This history of analogous jurisdictional manipulation
through the federal rules indicates that the Rules Enabling Act probably
does not prevent the rulemakers from providing nationwide personal ju-
risdiction through Rule 4.
Moreover, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has recommended that approval of the new rule's nationwide
personal jurisdiction provision be accompanied by express congressional
approval in the form of a statutory amendment.20 0 The tacit congres-
193 See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 718 (1974).
194 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
195 Though the caveat-the Rules Enabling Act's second sentence-is much discussed, it
was considered surplusage by its makers. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1107-08 (1982). Congress intended simply to reinforce the limitation
inherent in the first sentence, that the Court's power is to prescribe rules of "practice and
procedure." Id. at 1107-08. But see Ely, supra note 193, at 723 (suggesting second sentence be
given independent significance in evaluating validity of federal rule).
196 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
197 See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946) (Rule 4(f),
which governs where process may be served, is merely a procedural tool for efrecting enforce-
ment of substantive rights, which in no way violates the Act's proscription against abridging,
modifying, or altering those rights.); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) (quoting
Murphree); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). The Sibbach Court stated the test
as follows: "The [Rules Enabling Act] test must be whether a rule really regulates proce-
dure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach, 312
U.S. at 14. See Burbank, supra note 195, at 1028-32. Personal jurisdiction, as a necessary part
of the judicial process for enforcing rights, would likely be deemed "procedural" under the
Sibbach definition.
198 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
199 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
20 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Note at 1; notes 78-83 and accompanying text
supra.
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sional assent that accompanies the promulgation of every federal rule20 1
apparently did not satisfy the rulemakers. 20 2 Whether the Advisory
Committee worried that the rulemakers lacked authority under the Rules
Enabling Act to provide nationwide jurisdiction solely by enacting a fed-
eral rule203 or simply that, as a discretionary matter, it would be wiser for
Congress to enact so fundamental a rule, is not clear.204 Whatever the
reason for the rulemakers' deference, it is clear that congressional enact-
ment of the provision would circumvent whatever Rules Enabling Act
problems there might otherwise be. This is because the "substantive
right" limitation on the rulemaking power exists primarily to demarcate
the proper spheres of the legislative and judicial branches. 205 By recom-
mending that the enactment of the nationwide jurisdiction provision be
achieved by the affirmative will of Congress, the rulemakers gracefully
sidestep any potential problems raised by the Rules Enabling Act.20 6
C. Policy Attack
Some opponents of the new Rule 4 may attack the proposal on pol-
icy grounds, arguing that nationwide service of process in all federal
question cases will encourage harassment-motivated forum selection.
Expanding the range of available forums could allow plaintiffs to enjoy
an unfair tactical advantage.20 7 An Alaskan plaintiff, for instance, might
sue a Floridian defendant on a federal question claim in federal court in
Alaska. The proposed Rule 4 would authorize Alaska's federal court to
assert jurisdiction by serving process on the defendant in Florida. The
201 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); note 4 supra.
202 See Reporter's Draft, supra note 61, Rule 4(k), at 16 n.1, Advisory Committee Notes at
20.
203 One scholar has suggested that the rulemakers may lack authority to enact certain fun-
damental rules, such as a nationwide long-arm rule, not only by virtue of the Rules Enabling
Act, but also by virtue of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. See Whitten, supra
note 14, at 103-06. The proposed mechanism for enacting the new Rule 4, with Congress's
amending Title 28 to adopt the nationwide personal jurisdiction provision, bypasses not only
the Rules Enabling Act obstacle, but also Professor Whitten's separation of powers obstacle as
well.
204 Surprisingly, this provision is not discussed in the Advisory Committee Notes to the
proposed amendments. It was, however, addressed in the notes to an earlier draft. See note 82
supra.
205 See Burbank, supra note 195, at 1106-07.
206 For a discussion of what result would follow if Congress, contrary to the rulemakers'
wishes, fails to enact the desired provision, see note 83 supra.
207 A different policy attack might focus on the new rule's impact on the federal case load.
The new rule would allow more assertions of personal jurisdiction and would thus allow more
cases into the already overcrowded federal courts. However, the new rule would have a benefi-
cial impact on judicial efficiency in two ways. It would assist courts in eliminating multiplicity
of suits, see text accompanying notes 84-87 supra, and it would channel arguments regarding
the forum selection doctrines, see text accompanying notes 8-18 supra. These efficiencies
would counteract the docket control problem.
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harassment value of a lawsuit in a distant forum bestows on the plaintiff
a substantial bargaining edge in settlement negotiations, as the defendant
may well respond more coldly to the prospect of litigating in Alaska than
to acceding to the plaintiff's demands. To avoid the concomitant
problems of unfairness and inconvenience, critics of the new rule may
contend, the rulemakers should abandon the present Rule 4 proposal for
nationwide personal jurisdiction. 20 8
Moreover, their critique would run, these problems of unfairness
and inconvenience are exacerbated by the recent amendment to the cor-
porate venue statute.209 By linking venue to personal jurisdiction, that
statute now eliminates venue as a protective filter for screening out cases
involving corporations brought in patently inconvenient forums.210 This
new corporate venue statute, combined with a general nationwide service
provision, would raise serious harassment concerns. 2 "
These problems cannot be denied and should not be overlooked. If
they cannot be alleviated, they provide good reason indeed to consider
abandoning the proposed rule authorizing nationwide service in all fed-
eral question cases. To preserve the practical benefits promised by the
new Rule 4,212 some method must be found to alleviate the above
problems. In the following section, this Note discusses the filters
through which would pass assertions of judicial authority under the new
rule, filters that can strain out its potential ill effects.
III
A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE:
FILTERING OUT THE RULE'S ILL EFFECTS
Attacks on the proposed rule's constitutional and procedural valid-
ity should not succeed.2 13 Nonetheless, there remains the potential for
procedural unfairness. Plaintiffs could attempt to harass defendants by
suing in inconvenient forums. 214 Fortunately, these ill effects can be
screened out through the use of the three filters through which any fo-
rum choice must pass. Those fiters are: (1) the due process limit on
personal jurisdiction, (2) venue, and (3) forum non conveniens and venue
transfer. As discussed above, for these doctrines to provide effective pro-
208 If the rulemakers do not abandon the proposal, the Supreme Court or Congress would
still be empowered to reject it. See note 4 supra. Any policy attack on the proposed Rule 4
could thus be addressed to any of those bodies.
209 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1989).
210 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text supra.
211 See note 130 supra.
212 See notes 84-94 and accompanying text supra.
213 See notes 132-206 and accompanying text supra.
214 See text accompanying notes 207-11 supra.
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tection, they should operate independently of one another; where they
overlap excessively, 215 each is less effective than it could be. The pro-
posed rule will help to distinguish between personal jurisdiction, venue,
and forum non conveniens concerns, making possible the more effective
use of each doctrine.
Instead of wading through the current confused jumble of doctrines,
all of which purport to effectuate the same values, courts will be able to
say: Yes, we have power to adjudicate the rights of this defendant (per-
sonal jurisdiction), but as a matter of sovereign prerogative Congress has
decided that this suit should not be heard in this particular location
(venue),216 or as a matter of judicial discretion, we think this suit should
not be heard here (forum non conveniens and venue transfer).217 Prop-
erly understood, these distinct doctrines would strain out most of the
unfairness that might otherwise be engendered by plaintiffs choosing in-
convenient federal forums pursuant to a rule providing nationwide ser-
vice of process in all federal question cases.
A. Due Process
To say that a rule granting nationwide personal jurisdiction in all
federal question cases is not per se unconstitutional is not to say that
there is no constitutional limit on the application of that rule. The con-
stitutional limit, however, is not the fourteenth amendment requirement
of minimum contacts with the forum state.218 Rather, the limit is the
much looser fifth amendment requirement of minimum contacts with the
United States as a whole. 219 Where a defendant's aggregate contacts
215 For a discussion of the overlap and confusion inherent in current views of personal
jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens, see notes 13-18 and accompanying text supra.
216 "Unlike personal jurisdiction issues, which primarily concern the extent of a court's
power over the parties and the fairness of requiring a party to defend itself in a foreign forum,"
the Eleventh Circuit recently wrote, "venue primarily addresses the convenience of the fo-
rum." Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 857 (1Ith Cir.
1988) (citing Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)). Venue provisions do not
bespeak power. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939).
Unlike a default judgment entered without personal jurisdiction, one entered without proper
venue is not generally susceptible to collateral attack. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§§ 1, 4 comment h (1982).
217 Forum non conveniens allows a court to decline to adjudicate a dispute where another
forum would be substantially more convenient. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
507-09 (1947). See also Vandergriff v. Southern Ry. Co., 537 So. 2d 904, 905 (Ala. 1988)
(Torbert, C.J., dissenting) (discussing doctrine of forum non conveniens and its interplay with
jurisdiction and venue).
218 Some commentators advocate the use of this limit. See, e.g., Fullerton, supra note 71, at
38-60; Lusardi, supra note 30, at 32-33.
219 See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); FTC v. Jim
Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d
330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974). But see
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 408-09 n.5 (1987) (declining to
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with the nation as a whole are negligible, the assertion of personal juris-
diction over that defendant would violate fifth amendment due pro-
cess.220 The due process filter will thus take care of the potential
unfairness of haling into a United States court someone who has had
little or no contact with this country. Because this aggregate contacts
test is easy to meet,221 however, constitutional limits on personal jurisdic-
tion will do relatively little to curtail the ill effects of the new rule.
In addition to this constitutional limitation, there is arguably an-
other due process constraint on the location of suits. Where the incon-
venience of the forum is so extreme that the defendant is effectively
denied the ability to litigate, the defendant's due process right of an op-
portunity to be heard may be violated.2 n In other words, even if per-
sonal jurisdiction, understood as referring to the court's power over the
defendant, is in itself proper and even if venue, as defined by the applica-
ble statute, is also proper, the ultimate assertion of judicial authority in a
very inconvenient forum could violate a defendant's due process rights
under the fifth amendment. Notions of inconvenience alone, however,
are more consonant with venue and forum non conveniens, which courts
do not perceive as doctrines of constitutional dimension,M than with
personal jurisdiction. A constitutional requirement that focuses solely on
convenience and raises no questions of power, even if accepted, would
therefore be limited to the most egregious instances of inconvenientlitigation.224
Under the nationwide service of process system, then, due process
would screen out only the most egregious instances of unfairness. How-
address explicitly constitutionality of personal jurisdiction based on aggregate contacts with
United States); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.0 (1987) (same).
On the distinction between the fifth and fourteenth amendments, see note 149 supra.
220 See, e.g., Entek Corp. v. Southwest Pipe & Supply Co., 683 F. Supp. 1092, 1103 (N.D.
Tex. 1988) (defendant Singapore venture capital corporation dismissed for want of personal
jurisdiction due to lack of minimum contacts with United States).
221 See, e.g., Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defendants lack minimum contacts
with any particular state, but have substantial aggregate contacts with United States), aff'd sub
nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. CL 404 (1987).
222 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 484 (1985); McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957); DeJames v. Magnificent Carriers, 654 F.2d
280, 286 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981). Some courts, however, seem to reject even this small role for
convenience to play in fifth amendment forum selection doctrine. See, eg., Lisak v. Mercantile
Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant may not demand that court apply-
ing United States law in federal question case be conveniently located), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1472 (1988).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948) (venue); Carlenstolpe v.
Merck & Co., 819 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987) (forum non conveniens); Home v. Adolph Coors Co.,
684 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982) (venue).
224 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78, 483-84.
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ever, any residual unfairness left uncorrected by the filter of the due pro-
cess clause could be largely eliminated through the vigorous use of venue
principles.
B. Venue
Venue provisions restrict forum options in the interest of litigational
convenience. 225 Restrictive, defendant-oriented venue provisions would
greatly diminish the potential unfairness of the proposed nationwide ser-
vice rule.226
Generally, the federal venue statute227 protects defendants in federal
question cases by limiting the locales in which suit may be brought to the
districts where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.228 Thus,
in most federal question cases brought against individual defendants, the
current venue provision would protect adequately against unfairness.
That venue protection, however, historically has been weaker for corpo-
rate defendants and recently became weaker still with the passage of a
new corporate venue statute.229
By linking corporate venue to personal jurisdiction 230 at a time
when federal question personal jurisdiction may soon span the nation,
the corporate venue amendment may unwittingly create nationwide
venue. If the new Rule 4 becomes effective, then a federal question case
involving a corporate defendant 231 properly could be brought in any
United States district court.232 The potential for harassment, inconven-
ience, and unfairness would be tremendous.233
For venue to serve effectively as a constraint on the unfairness of
225 See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979); Denver & R.G.W.R.R.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560 (1967).
226 Indeed, the current venue provisions are the greatest limitation on the practical effects
that adoption of the proposed Rule 4 would cause. See notes 122-31 and accompanying text
supra.
227 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982).
228 Id. § 1391(b).
229 "For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1989).
Prior to the adoption of the 1988 amendment, the corporate venue statute read: "A cor-
poration may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) (amended 1988). See notes
127-30 and accompanying text supra.
230 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text supra.
231 See note 129 supra.
232 A corporate defendant would have no grounds to object to personal jurisdiction or
venue. Such a defendant could, however, use forum non conveniens or venue transfer to at-
tack the choice of forum. See notes 247-61 and accompanying text infra.
233 See note 130 supra.
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forcing defendants to litigate in inconvenient forums, the corporate venue
statute would have to be revamped. The linkage of venue and personal
jurisdiction should not apply to federal question cases. Rather, the cor-
porate venue provision for federal question cases should approximate
more closely the general federal question venue statute.2-4 Corporate
residence, for venue purposes, should be limited in federal question cases
to those judicial districts in which the corporation is incorporated or do-
ing business.235 Corporate defendants, like individual defendants, could
then receive protection from the venue filter. Short of statutory amend-
ment, this result could be achieved by thoughtful judicial interpretation
of the new corporate venue provision. Congress certainly did not intend
to create nationwide venue. To avoid such an unintended result, it would
be appropriate for courts to construe "any judicial district in which [the
corporation] is subject to personal jurisdiction" to mean any district in
which the corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
absence of any applicable nationwide service provision.
Restrictive, defendant-oriented venue provisions236 would not keep
the new Rule 4 from achieving its practical and doctrinal benefits. The
practical benefit of enabling plaintiffs to bring multiple defendants to-
gether in one court-where previously the defendants would not all have
been amenable to that court's personal jurisdiction237-will still be
achieved. Restrictive venue, so long as it allows a suit to be brought
234 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982). See text accompanying notes 227-28 supra.
235 To avoid nationwide venue problems, perhaps the rulemakers should flag the conflict
between the proposed Rule 4 and the new corporate venue statute in their prefatory Note. In
addition to recommending that Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see text accompanying
notes 80-81 supra, the Note could recommend that Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Rule
82 prohibits the rulemakers from extending or limiting venue, see text accompanying note 187
supra, but that should not preclude their giving appropriate advice.
In order to limit venue to those forums where defendants generally will not be unfairly
inconvenienced, if § 1391(c) is amended as recommended, "doing business" could be con-
strued in a manner congruent with cases interpreting the phrase under the pre-amended ver-
sion of the corporate venue statute. See, eg., Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 813 F.2d 901,
904-05 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting "doing business" to mean "engaging in transactions... to
such an extent and of such a nature that the state in which the district is located could require
a foreign corporation to [comply with state registration law]") (citing Johnson Creative Arts,
Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984)); Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. I Bar-
B-Que Restaurant, 760 F.2d 312, 317 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same). But see 15 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3811 (Supp. 1989) (commenting on
difficulty of interpreting "doing business," criticizing approach of Johnson Creatle Arts, and
lauding new linkage of personal jurisdiction and venue). Some have suggested defining "doing
business" for § 1391(c) in terms of the systematic and continuous business activity required for
general jurisdiction, as opposed to specific jurisdiction. See Letter from Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg to Professor Charles Alan Wright (July 31, 1985) (on file at New York University
Law Review); Note; Defining "Doing Business" to Determine Corporate Venue, 65 Tex. L
Rev. 153, 183 (1986).
236 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).
237 See notes 84-87 and accompanying text supra.
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where the claim arose, would not hamper that objective. Likewise, re-
strictive venue would not interfere with the practical benefit of enabling
plaintiffs to sue defendants who have sufficient aggregate contacts with
the United States as a whole but lack significant contacts with any partic-
ular state.238 The proposed Rule 4's beneficial clarification of personal
jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens concerns would also be
unaffected by defendant-oriented venue.
On the other hand, restrictive, defendant-oriented venue would
guarantee defendants that the forum would not be unfairly inconvenient,
even under nationwide service of process. If suit could be brought only
where the defendant resides or where the cause of action arose, 239 plain-
tiffs generally would be unable to choose forums for their harassment
value.
Congress intended the nationwide service statutes, 240 in part, to
pinpoint particular substantive areas of federal law where broad forum
options were felt particularly necessary. 241 The proposed Rule 4 would
eliminate this concentration on specialized areas of law by making all
federal laws equal for purposes of service of process. 242 Those necessary
distinctions could be reinfused into federal law through the use of non-
transsubstantive 2 43 venue rules. These rules would establish appropriate
venue requirements for different substantive areas of law. Such special-
ized venue provisions, based on a balancing of convenience and substan-
tive policy concerns particular to each statutory field, would enable
Congress to provide broader or narrower forum options as necessary.
Where it is considered of utmost importance to hale the defendant into
federal court at the location of the plaintiff's choosing, nationwide ser-
vice of process could be combined with a plaintiff-oriented venue provi-
sion.z44 Conversely, where Congress is concerned that defendants not be
238 See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
239 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).
240 For a listing of statutes that include nationwide service provisions, see note 30 supra.
241 See Sinclair, supra note 34, at 1243.
242 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, Rule 4(l), at 15-16.
243 See note 264 infra.
244 Especially relevant here would be plaintiff venue, i.e., venue in the district where the
plaintiff resides. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982) (proper venue in diversity cases includes
plaintiff venue). Such a combination of nationwide service and plaintiff-oriented venue is pro-
vided for in mandamus actions against federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982) (com-
bining nationwide service of process with proper venue wherever "(1) a defendant in the action
resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action") (emphasis
added).
Assertions of authority in very inconvenient forums pursuant to such a combination of
nationwide service and liberal venue, however, may risk running afoul of the due process
clause in extreme cases. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 484 (1985)
(finding no due process violation but recognizing potential problem); McGee v. International
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inconvenienced, nationwide service of process can be coupled with a par-
ticularly restrictive statutory venue provision.245
Many nationwide service statutes carry with them restrictive venue
provisions to avoid excessive inconvenience. 24 Congress considers venue
a necessary and appropriate method for curtailing the harmful impact of
the substantively narrow nationwide service statutes now in existence. In
the same manner, venue should also be used to curtail the impact of the
much broader nationwide service provision proposed for Rule 4. Indeed,
venue restrictions provide the most significant limitation on the potential
unfairness engendered by a general federal question nationwide service
rule.
Venue provisions, though, are limited in that they are nondiscretion-
ary. A legislature enacting a venue statute cannot consider the peculiar
facts of a case at hand. Rather, a legislature must try to predict which
locales will be convenient and appropriate for hearing certain general
types of cases. Venue restrictions, therefore, inevitably fail to screen out
some of the instances in which a plaintiff's chosen forum would be unfair
to the defendant. The fine-tuning necessary for eliminating forum selec-
tion unfairness case by case must come from more discretionary doc-
trines: forum non conveniens and venue transfer.
C. Forum Non Conveniens and Venue Transfer
Forum non conveniens is the common law's tool for reducing un-
fairness occasioned by plaintiff's choice of forum.247 Under this discre-
tionary doctrine, a court may dismiss a suit if a more appropriate forum
exists.248 To a greater degree than personal jurisdiction or even venue,
forum non conveniens concerns itself with the convenience of the par-
ties.249 For that reason, the doctrine should be included in the list of
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (same); text accompanying notes 222-24 supra.
245 Such a venue provision might, for instance, allow suits to be brought only in the district
where the defendant is domiciled.
246 See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982) (venue in antitrust action against corpora-
tion proper where defendant "is an inhabitant, . may be found or transacts business");
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (Supp. V 1987) (venue proper where "defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took
place, if the defendant participated therein").
247 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947); R. Casad, supra note 5, § 4:23.
248 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507-09.
249 Personal jurisdiction and venue, to the extent they implicate convenience concerns, use
state or district lines as a proxy for convenience. Such boundaries serve inadequately as a
proxy because they ignore the crucial difference between, for example, Massachusetts-Rhode
Island and Massachusetts-Arizona. Moreover, to use such boundaries as a proxy is to fail to
recognize that one defendant may suffer no inconvenience in crossing a nearby state line, while
another defendant may suffer substantial inconvenience in being dragged across a large state.
See Stein, supra note 13, at 791-92. State lines do not measure decisively the time and trouble
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devices for curtailing the ill effects of a nationwide jurisdiction rule.
Closely related to forum non conveniens is venue transfer.25 0 In-
deed, the federal venue transfer statute251 has been called a federal codifi-
cation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 252 Under that statute, a
federal district court may transfer a case to another district "[fjor the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."'2 3 The
primary difference between forum non conveniens and venue transfer is
that under the former, a suit is dismissed, 254 whereas under the latter, a
suit is not dismissed but rather transferred to another district.2 5
One criticism of the new Rule 4 is that it would allow the assertion
of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an unfairly inconvenient fo-
rum. If, in such a case, the limitations of due process and venue fail to
preclude the plaintiff's choice of forum, forum non conveniens or venue
transfer should be used to overcome this unfairness. By changing a suit's
location pursuant to section 1404(a), or by dismissing it on the ground of
forum non conveniens, a court can counter the potential for unfairness
inherent in the Rule 4 proposal. If a plaintiff chooses an inconvenient
forum for its harassment value,256 then the defendant may be able to
show that another forum is more appropriate.
In fact, the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be strengthened
by the new rule. First, there will be a greater need for forum non con-
veniens dismissals, because personal jurisdiction in distant forums will be
easier to obtain.257 Second, by helping to clarify the purposes of each of
the forum selection doctrines, the new rule will give each of the protec-
tive doctrines, including forum non conveniens and venue transfer, more
involved in traveling from place to place. Rather, actual inconvenience must be measured by
considering absolute distance, travel routes, and geographic remoteness, and perhaps the iden-
tity of the defendant as well. The doctrine of forum non conveniens frankly focuses on the
actual inconvenience to all those involved. See R. Casad, supra note 5, § 1:07.
250 See R. Casad, supra note 5, § 4:26.
251 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
252 See id. § 1404(a) annot. (historical & revision notes). One commentator calls this "a
creative bit of retroactive legislative history," because the transfer provision had been proposed
several years before the Supreme Court's adoption, in GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 504-05, of forum
non conveniens for the federal courts. Stein, supra note 13, at 807.
253 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). The transferee district must be one "where [the action]
might have been brought." Id. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960).
254 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507. A federal court would dismiss an action rather than
transfer venue where the more convenient forum is not another federal district, but rather a
state court or a court of another country. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
260 (1981) (suit dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens because more convenient fo-
rum was in Scotland); Gross v. Owen, 221 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (suit dismissed on
grounds of forum non conveniens because more convenient forum was Maryland state court).
255 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
256 See text accompanying note 207 supra.
257 See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
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"bite." Once it is clear, as a doctrinal matter, that personal jurisdiction
determines not that the forum is a convenient one but only that the court
has power over the parties, and that convenience is to be addressed by
the protective doctrines of venue, forum non conveniens, and venue
transfer, courts will employ more effectively those protective doctrines to
screen out genuinely inconvenient forums.
One problem with depending on forum non conveniens and venue
transfer to protect defendants from the unfairness of being forced to liti-
gate in inconvenient forums, however, is that those doctrines rely heavily
on judicial discretion.258 As such, they are both less predictable and
more difficult to overturn on appeal 59 than less discretionary doctrines
such as venue.260 Nonetheless, by letting such factors as convenience of
parties, convenience of witnesses, state interest, and availability of evi-
dence weigh against a plaintiff's choice of forum,26' forum non con-
veniens and venue transfer help to put the defendant on a more equal
footing with the plaintiff.
In sum, a constructive response can overcome the proposed rule's ill
effects, namely, the inconvenience and unfairness that can result from a
plaintiff's harassment-motivated choice of a distant forum. Such a re-
sponse would not oppose the rule as a whole, but rather would address its
undesired effects. As has been demonstrated, existing procedural doc-
trines can achieve this goal. Federal practice has developed three
filters-due process, venue, and forum non conveniens and venue trans-
fer-through which a choice of forum must pass. Properly utilized, these
filters allow defendants to overcome much of the potential unfairness in-
herent in the proposed rule by diverting cases from inappropriate forums.
Due process would eliminate some unfair forum selections, but is limited
to the most egregious cases. Venue, as long as it is defendant-oriented,
precludes many more potentially inconvenient forum choices. Finally,
where the facts of a particular case show that the forum chosen by the
plaintiff is plainly inferior to another option, despite proper personal ju-
risdiction and venue, the discretionary doctrines of forum non con-
veniens and venue transfer can strain out the inferior choice.
259 See PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 257; Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory
LJ. 747, 749-54 (1982); Stein, supra note 13, at 785.
259 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257; Stein, supra note 13, at 785.
260 See generally Stein, supra note 13 (criticizing excessive dependence on forum non
conveniens).
261 For the most widely cited list of factors to be considered, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
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IV
BEYOND A NEw RULE 4
The new Rule 4 would bring both practical advantages262 and disad-
vantages, 263 and should engender practical responses to minimize its
problems while maintaining its benefits. There is something particularly
fundamental, however, about a rule providing for nationwide personal
jurisdiction in all federal question cases. A discussion of the new rule
should therefore address more than the rule's practicalities; it should ad-
dress the rule's implications for the future direction of civil procedure
doctrine.
A. A More Rational Transsubstantiveness
The new rule carries implications for how rules of civil procedure
ought to be structured. Attacking transsubstantive rules264 is all the rage
among proceduralists these days.265 One set of federal rules of civil pro-
cedure, critics contend, inadequately addresses the widely varying proce-
dural concerns inherent in different substantive areas of law.266 A future
shift in civil procedure may well be away from transsubstantive rules and
towards rules that vary with the category of substantive law. Why, then,
would the federal rulemakers choose to make nationwide service of pro-
cess-heretofore available only in discrete substantively defined areas-
available transsubstantively?
Perhaps it is too simplistic to define the trend merely as a shift away
from transsubstantive rules. Rather, the trend should be seen as a shift
toward more rational transsubstantiveness. Viewed in this light, the
rulemakers' proposal makes sense. Personal jurisdiction, a largely con-
stitutional matter of power over people, should be applied consistently
across different areas of law, so long as the sovereign power remains the
262 See text accompanying notes 84-95 supra.
263 See text accompanying notes 207-11 supra.
264 "Transsubstantive" rules are rules that apply across all substantive areas of law, as op-
posed to "specialized" or "nontranssubstantive" rules, which apply only to specifically defined
areas of law. The current federal rules of civil procedure are transsubstantive.
265 See, e.g., Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 716-17 (1988); Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudica-
tory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 527-28 (1986); Silberman, Judicial Ad-
juncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2131, 2175-78
(1989); Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1999, 2042-43, 2048-51 (1989). But see
Carrington, supra note 4, at 2068-69 (arguing that critique on transsubstantive rules is mis-
guided); Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237, 2244-47 (1989) (same).
266 See Burbank, supra note 265, at 716-17; Resnick, supra note 265, at 527-28; Subrin,
supra note 265, at 2048-51.
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same. Venue, on the other hand, is a matter of sovereign prerogative.2 67
Therefore, venue need not be treated equivalently across those substan-
tive legal areas, but rather should be used to accommodate varying sub-
stantive policy concerns. Instead of providing nationwide personal
jurisdiction only for specific statutory areas, it makes more doctrinal
sense to provide it for all federal question cases, and to limit its impact
with a generally applicable, restrictive venue statute and broader or nar-
rower substance-specific venue provisions where needed to further partic-
ular policies.268
This inclination toward a more rational transsubstantiveness, em-
bodied in the new rule, goes hand in hand with the disentangling of the
doctrines of personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens.2 69
With personal jurisdiction properly linked to the power of the sovereign
that created the court,270 these doctrines can be understood and applied
in keeping with the particular values they are intended to further. In the
case of personal jurisdiction, the doctrine is best applied transsubstan-
tively, since the power of a federal court over a given defendant in a
federal question case should not vary depending on which particular fed-
eral statute is at issue.271 Venue requirements, on the other hand, are
best constructed only partly transsubstantively. While a generally appli-
cable federal question venue statute may ensure appropriate forums for
most cases, the policies underlying some federal statutes may be better
served by specialized venue provisions allowing broader27 or nar-
rower 273 forum options. Finally, forum non conveniens and venue trans-
fer are rationally viewed as the least transsubstantive of all, since those
doctrines are properly applied on a discretionary, case-by-case basis.2 74
267 See FTC v. in Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (When
minimum contacts exist with the relevant sovereign, due process no longer protects a defen-
dant from distant litigation because the location of permissible venues is a matter of sovereign
prerogative."); Brilmayer, How Contacts Count- Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 109 (venue is matter of sovereign prerogative, not of con-
stitutional due process).
268 If nationwide service were to be combined with plaintiff venue, however, some assertions
of judicial authority in extremely inconvenient locations could violate, by their very inconven-
ience, the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzcwicz,
471 U.S. 462, 477, 484 (1985); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24
(1957); notes 222-24 and accompanying text supra.
269 See text accompanying notes 215-17 supra.
270 See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); text accompa-
nying notes 149-60, 216-17 supra.
271 See text accompanying notes 149-60 supra.
272 See text accompanying note 244 supra.
273 See text accompanying note 245 supra.
274 See text accompanying notes 258-60 supra.
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B. A More Rational Vision of Federal Courts
The new rule also carries implications for how the federal court sys-
tem is perceived. Rule 4's present requirement that federal courts gener-
ally mimic state courts for purposes of service of process encourages a
perception that a federal court is not fundamentally different from a state
court, but merely another courthouse, which exercises the same power as
a court of the state in which the federal court sits. This perception is
strongest where the federal court is hearing a diversity case,275 but the
perception encouraged by Rule 4 applies equally where the federal court
is hearing a federal question case. This is because service of process
under the current Rule 4 generally must conform with state limitations
even in federal question cases. 276
It should be recognized that the federal judiciary serves a purpose
distinct from that of the state judiciaries. 277 Implications to the contrary,
such as those inherent in the current Rule 4, strain our perception of the
very structure of the United States federal system. 278 Dissenting from
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in the Omni case, Judge Wisdom wrote, "The
majority's conclusion [rejecting nationwide service of process in a private
action under the federal Commodity Exchange Act] does violence to the
structure of the American polity. A federal court's service arm in a fed-
eral question case should not be handcuffed to the place of the court's
seat." 279
The proposed rule, by allowing federal but not state courts280 to
serve process nationwide, properly treats federal courts differently from
state courts. It thus takes one step toward a more rational view of the
federal court system. But it is only one step. The new rule would pro-
vide nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal question cases, but not in
275 See Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing diversity action, in
which federal court sits as state court and there is therefore good reason to follow International
Shoe, from federal question case, in which no such reason exists), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital
Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
276 See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
277 Cf. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 147 (J. Mayer ed. 1969). In his chapter
entitled "Procedure of the Federal Courts," Tocqueville comments on the need, in a federal
system, to counteract the natural weakness of the federal judiciary: "The lawgiver in a confed-
eration must constantly strive to give the courts a standing analogous to that of those in na-
tions which have not divided sovereignty; in other words, his constant efforts must be bent
toward making federal justice represent the nation." Id.
278 Cf. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (rejecting
argument that nationwide service of process violates due process when defendant lacks mini-
mum contacts with district because argument ignores important differences between state and
federal jurisdiction).
279 Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 428 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
280 For a discussion of the interplay between nationwide service of process and concurrent
jurisdiction, see note 290 infra.
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cases where subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizen-
ship.281 This sharp differentiation between federal question and diversity
cases may oversimplify the concerns that should underlie grants of na-
tionwide personal jurisdiction. Viewed in light of the essential difference
between state and federal courts, the key question should not be whether
subject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question, but whether the
court is fulfilling some distinctly federal function-that is, whether the
court is "acting federally. '282
A bill recently considered by Congress illustrates this "acting feder-
ally" approach to determining what types of actions warrant nationwide
service of process. The section of the Court Reform and Access to Jus-
tice Act of 1988 subtitled "Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction" pro-
posed the creation of a new type of original jurisdiction in the federal
courts.283 Federal jurisdiction would be created to solve some of the
problems of dispersed and complex litigation.284 The proposed jurisdic-
tional grant was to provide "a consolidated adjudication of liability in
mass tort eases involving dispersed parties." 285
Although the multiparty, multiforum jurisdictional grant was not to
be based on the presence of any federal question, but rather on diversity
of citizenship,286 its function was distinctly federal-in the words of the
House Report, "a valuable function for which the Federal judicial forum
would be uniquely suited." 287 The bill proposed nationwide service of
281 Interpleader cases are the sole exception. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
282 Some types of cases in which federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship have been subjects of proposals for nationwide service of process. See, e.g., notes
283-89 and accompanying text infra (multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction); Freer, Rethinking
Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1061,
1097 (1985) (certain cases involving indispensible parties); H.R. 3662, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 1 (1988) (products liability cases involving foreign defendants). Nationwide service of pro-
cess for interpleader, the jurisdictional grant of which is premised on diversity of citizenship,
see R. Casad, supra note 5, at § 3.27, is well established. See note 71 supra.
283 See H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1988). Representative Kstenmeier re-
cently reintroduced the idea to the House in a bill entitled the "Multiparty, Multiforum Juis-
diction Act of 1989." H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989). For scholarly articles
proposing such jurisdiction, see Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Class
Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale LJ. 1, 75-78 (1986); Rowe & Sibley,
Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. Pa. L Rev. 7 (1986).
284 See H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1988); H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 37 (1988).
285 H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1988).
286 The proposed jurisdiction would have required only minimum diversity, H.R. 4807,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1988), rather than maximum diversity as required under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The constitutional
jurisdictional grant that makes possible the proposed jurisdiction is nonetheless that of diver-
sity jurisdiction, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; I-R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1988), since the Constitution requires only minimum diversity, see State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
287 H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988). The Report proceeds to explain
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process for this new type of action288 to facilitate its uniquely federal
function.289
The merits of the multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction bill are be-
yond the scope of this Note. But this brief discussion shows the rele-
vance of the federal judiciary's uniqueness290 to questions of nationwide
service of process. In those types of actions where the federal courts act
in a peculiarly federal way, it is important that they be perceived as dif-
ferent from state courts in order to fulfill their uniquely federal function.
Just as bringing together a mass tort case into one forum would be a
uniquely federal function, so is enforcing federal law with vigor and na-
tional uniformity. Federal courts in federal question cases are acting fed-
erally, in this sense. Nationwide personal jurisdiction helps the courts to
fulfill their uniquely federal function in such cases.
The new Rule 4's bright line between federal question and diversity
cases may be too simplistic a vision of when federal courts are truly "act-
ing federally." The new rule, therefore, may not go far enough in treat-
ing federal courts differently from state courts for purposes of personal
jurisdiction. But the proposal indicates a more rational vision than that
suggested by the current Rule 4, which fails to treat federal courts dis-
that the proposed jurisdiction "is not an invasion of the domain of state courts but rather a
focused use of the Federal judicial forum to employ its unique capabilities to deal with dis-
persed, related actions." Id. An important aspect of the federal judiciary's "unique" ability to
manage the problem of multiparty, multiforum litigation is its ability, through nationwide
service, to "bring scattered parties together in one forum . ... " Id. at 37.
288 H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (1988). As reintroduced, see note 283 supra, the
bill still proposes nationwide service of process. See H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 7
(1989).
289 H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1988).
290 In many federal question areas, the federal and state courts share concurrent jurisdic-
tion. See R. Casad, supra note 5, § 3:24. Most of the current nationwide service provisions,
however, pertain to cases in which federal subject matter jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus the
potentially wider range of process in federal courts rarely results in forum shopping between
the federal and state courts. See id. § 6:02.
The interplay between nationwide service and concurrent jurisdiction would become more
significant should the new Rule 4 be enacted. In a case in which a federal court would be
empowered to employ nationwide service of process, a state court with concurrent jurisdiction
would not be similarly empowered, even if the authorization for nationwide service came not
from Rule 4, but rather from a federal statute that the state court is enforcing. See Lakewood
Bank & Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 463, 470-71, 180 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918
(1982).
The new disparity in range of process between state and federal courts could put a new
twist in the lawyerly pastime of forum-shopping. Plaintiffs could choose federal forums in
order to avail themselves of the broader federal service of process. "Forum-shopping" is gen-
erally a pejorative term. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (advocating
"discouragement of forum-shopping"). In this context, however, it simply refers to the practi-
cal benefits the new rule seeks to achieve-enabling plaintiffs to bring defendants together in
one forum and allowing assertions of jurisdiction over otherwise unavailable alien defendants.
See text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
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tinctly even in federal question cases. The nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion provision of the new Rule 4 takes one major step towards a more
coherent view of the role of federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Amendments to Rule 4 currently under consideration by the federal
rulemakers would authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction in all fed-
eral question cases. The new rule would be beneficial and a legitimate
exercise of the rulemakers' power.
The new Rule 4's practical impact would be more limited than one
might expect, as a result of venue limitations. The rule would nonethe-
less confer substantial benefits, including litigational efficiency, expanded
federal regulatory power, and a decrease in the comparative disadvantage
domestic corporations face in international trade competition.
Constitutional challenges to the rule's legitimacy fail. Such chal-
lenges are based on a faulty analogy between state and federal court per-
sonal jurisdiction; they assume incorrectly that "fairness" in the
jurisdictional sense refers solely to convenience. Likewise, procedural
challenges fail. Expansion of personal jurisdiction is a valid exercise of
the rulemakers' authority. Moreover, the rulemakers have allayed any
residual procedural fears by encouraging Congress to give the new rule
express assent in the form of a legislative enactment.
Still, the rule's potential for unfairness demands attention. Plain-
tiffs' counsel will be all too eager to sue in forums deliberately inconve-
nient to defendants, hoping to tilt the scales of settlement with the weight
of harassment. Therefore, to avoid unfairness, the rule's impact must be
curtailed by an overlay of defendant-oriented venue provisions and by
the vigorous employment of forum non conveniens and venue transfer.
The use of these restrictive court access doctrines would be facilitated by
the new rule, because the new rule would help disentangle the doctrines
of personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens. By clarifying
the functions of these doctrines, the new Rule 4 would enhance their
impact. Thus, perhaps counterintuitively, this rule permitting nation-
wide service of process may actually decrease unfairness and inconven-
ience to defendants.
Looking beyond the rule's practicalities, such a broadly applicable
nationwide service provision carries important implications for the direc-
tion of civil procedure doctrine. The rulemakers' decision to make na-
tionwide service of process available transsubstantively, at a time when
the general trend in procedure is away from transsubstantive rules, sug-
gests an acceptance of selective, rational transsubstantiveness. The deci-
sion to make nationwide service available in all federal question cases,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1989]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
but not in diversity cases, indicates a first step toward a more rational
vision of the role of federal courts in our federal system.
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